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Abstract 
lbis dissertation investigates the relationship between corporate income tax rates 
and inbound foreign direct investment in the United States. In the two essays presented, 
the first estimates the effect of the corporate income tax rate on FDI inflows, while 
controlling for other non-tax variables. The study uses time series data over the period 
1957-2002 and employs cointegration techniques and error correction models to estimate 
the long run and the short run tax responses. The corporate income tax rate is found to 
exert a significant negative effect on total FDI inflows in the long run. A one percent 
decrease in the tax rate will increase total FDI by 2.4 percent. The tax rate is also found to 
exert significant negative effect on transfer funds in the long and short run. Tax rate 
elasticities are larger in absolute value terms for the transfer funds than for total FDI. In 
the long run, reinvested component of FDI is not responsive to the U.S. corporate income 
tax rate. 
The second essay investigates whether the corporate income tax rate is an 
important detenninant of inbound FDI by incorporating both host country and home 
country tax rates into the analysis. We find that inbound FDI shares a significantly 
negative relationship with the host country corporate income tax rate, and a positive 
relationship with the home country tax rates. This essay also examines whether investors' 
decisions are affected differently by the various corporate taxation systems of the 
investing countries. Findings suggest that investors from exemption countries are more 
responsive to the U.S. corporate income tax rate than are those from tax credit countries. 
However, the groups are not systematically different in their response to home country 
corporate income tax rates. 
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Considerable research effort has been devoted to identifying determinants of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the United States. Interest in this area of research has been 
stimulated by the unprecedented growth in FDI and by recognition of the importance FDI 
holds for investment and growth in the host country. A number of empirical studies have 
investigated the impacts of corporate income tax rates on FDI in the United States. 
Although these studies have not reached an agreement regarding the relative responses of 
individual FDI components to changes in tax· rates, there is a general consensus that FDI 
is sensitive to changes in the corporate income tax rate. This finding has lead to concern 
over the possibility of tax competition among countries to attract FDI. Governments 
might enact tax policies to attract FDI inflows and to counter the threat of FDI outflows. 
This dissertation investigates the role of corporate income tax rates on FDI in the 
United States, while controlling for other important macroeconomic factors. There are 
two closely related essays of this dissertation. The first essay revisits the time series 
literature on taxation and aggregate FDI inflows in the United States. The second essay 
examines the impacts of host country and home country corporate tax rate changes on the 
amount of FDI flows into the United States. 
Several features of the first essay represent improvements over earlier time series 
studies to examine the responsiveness of FDI to changes in the corporate income tax rate. 
First, this essay uses cointegration techniques to investigate the long run relationship 
between tax rate and FDI. A single equation approach suggested by Engle and Granger 
(1987) and multi-equation method proposed by Johansen (1991) are used to analyze 
cointegration relationships. Second, this essay also estimates short run impacts of tax rate 
changes on FDI. An error correction model is used to illustrate short run dynamics of the 
2 
variables. These relationships are examined for aggregated FDI as well as for 
disaggregated components of FOi (transfer funds and reinvested funds). 
The second essay uses panel estimation techniques to investigate the effects of 
host country and home country tax policies on the amount of FDI flows into the United 
States. This contributes to the literature by employing pooled estimation techniques such 
as, fixed effects and random effects models to analyze possible relationship between 
corporate tax rates and FDI inflows. This essay uses foreign direct investment data from 
nine investing countries into the United States over 1982-2000 period. The study 
investigates whether investors' decisions are affected by the various taxation systems 
used in their own countries. We control for the different tax systems by including 
countries that adopt tax credit system and countries that adopt tax exemption system. Our 
sample consists of 4 tax credit countries and 5 tax exemption countries. We investigate 
._I 
whether results vary between tax credit countries and tax exemption countries. 
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Essay One 
The Corporate Income Tax Rate and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Time Series Evidence from the United States 
4 
Introduction 
One of the most impressive economic developments since early 1970 has been the 
increasing importance of foreign capital over domestic capital in the United States. 
Foreign capital consists of two major components: Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), in 
which investors wield substantial control over the management of invested capital, and 
Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI), in which such power is relatively minimal. Though 
both types of investments have been on the rise over the last five decades, the former has 
received more attention than the latter due to its stronger influence on the economy. 
During the most part of the 20th century, the U.S. was not considered a leading 
destination for foreign direct investment. However, beginning in 1980, the United States 
started to experience a remarkable increase in its FDI capital inflow and this trend 
continued throughout the next two decades. To illustrate, annual US FDI inflows grew 
from about $20 billion in 1980 to $294 billion in 1999. During this period, the annual 
growth rate also showed an extraordinary upward trend. The annual growth rate of FDI 
reached an astonishing 100 percent mark in 1983 and 1993. This trend helped the United 
States surpass China to become the world's largest foreign direct investment recipient in 
1992, and it was able to maintain this status until 2001 1 • According to the world 
Investment Report (UNCT AD), the United States received approximately one third of
total world foreign direct investments in 1999. This surge has affected many other sectors
such as international trade, gross domestic product, and employment. For instance, sales
1 However, in 2002, US fel1 from its leading position and China regained its status as the major FDI
recipient attracting approximately $53 bil1ion. 
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by foreign-owned U.S. affiliates totaled $1717 billion in 1997.2 Further, US 
affiliates employed approximately 5.2 million workers in the same year. This 
unprecedented growth in FDI, and recognition of the importance that FDI holds for 
investment and growth in the host country have stimulated a growing interest 
especially among international and public policy oriented economists. A 
considerable research effort has been devoted to identifying determinants of foreign 
direct investment in the United States. Analyses have been conducted using both 
time series and panel estimation techniques. 
However, only a few studies have accounted for the impact of corporate 
income tax policies even though a mere casual observation suggests a close a 
relationship between the two variables. It is also consistent with the eclectic theory 
(Dunning, 1981), which is arguably the most appealing model for understanding 
foreign direct investment. It suggests that an investor take three factors into account 
before undertaking an investment project in another country. They are the so-called 
ownership advantage, location advantage, and internalization advantage. In 
general, corporate taxes could affect all three of these conditions (Mooij and 
Ederveen, 2001). Researchers, who favor this notion, are of the opinion that major 
tax reform acts, such as TRA1986 have preceded the emergence of FDI inflows in 
late 1980s. 
Although these studies have not reached an agreement regarding the size of 
the tax effect, there is a general consensus that FOi does respond to the corporate 
income tax rate. This finding has led to concern over the possibility of tax 
2 U.S. International Trade Commissions (2001). 
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competition among countries to attract foreign capital in the form of FDI and to 
counter the threat of FDI outflows. The ability of governments to use tax policies to 
influence FDI flows will depend on the long run and short run responsiveness of 
FDI to changes in the corporate income tax rate. 
The major purpose of this essay is to revisit the time series literature on FDI 
and corporate income taxation on FDI in the United States using modem time 
series techniques. To my knowledge, the most recent time series study that uses the 
U.S. data dates back to 1990 (Slemrod, 1990), and all of the exiting studies have 
only used traditional time series methods for estimation and analysis. 
This study makes at least two contributions. First, this makes use of the, 
modem time series techniques to estimate the long run and short run tax rate 
elasticity. It is important because a substantial improvement has occurred in the 
,I 
time series literature beginning in the late 1980s through most part of the 1990s. 
Second, previous time series studies were unable to incorporate the most recent 
FDI and corporate tax rate data into their analyses. Therefore, utilizing modem 
estimation techniques along with a data set that spans nearly five decades will 
broaden our understanding of the relationship between corporate income tax rate 
and FDI in the United States. 
Literature Review 
An extraordinary surge in the FDI flows into the United States since late 
1970s spurred unprecedented interest among researchers on the subject. However, 
early time series studies on determinants of FDI did not include the tax rate as an 
explanatory variable. Hartman (1984) is the first study to investigate the effects of 
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taxation on inbound FDI3 • Since Hartman, several well-known studies have been 
undertaken on this issue. We could categorize them into two components: time series 
studies and panel data studies. This section is confined to the time series literature by 
leaving the discussion of panel studies to the second essay. 
As suggested before, many agree that time series study on FDI and taxation 
begins with Hartman (1984). Because virtually all of the subsequent studies have used 
Hartman as the base line model, it is extremely important to understand the basic features 
of this seminal paper in detail. 
Motivation for the study came as a result of his investigation of 1981 tax reforms, 
which was designed to accelerate rate of savings and rate of investments in the United 
States. Hartman points out that savings and investment incentives did not only affect 
domestic investors but also resulted in large increases in investments by foreigners. He 
hypothesizes that investment incentives, which apply to both domestic and foreign 
investors, may result in increased foreign investment in the United States. The standard 
investment theories suggest that investors determine their capital investments according 
to the value of real after tax rate of return on alternative investments. Using the FDI data 
over the period of 1965-1979, Hartman estimates the model given in equation (1.1) to 
understand the effect of tax policy on FDI in the United States. 









(FDI) ] , ] [(1-t')] 
GNP (1-t) 
(I.I) 
Here t measures the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by foreigners and t' denotes 
the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by U.S. investors. Three types of rate of return 
3 Detailed study on tax rates and FDI can be found in Hines (1997) and Mooij and Ederveen (2001). 
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variables are used to explain the variance of FDI inflows in which all of them are 
expressed in terms of rate of return variables. The first term, y(l-t) is the after tax rate of 
return actually realized by foreign investors. This rate is included for capturing the tax 
impact on foreign firms that are already in the business and are considering expansion of 
current operations. The second term, y' ( 1-t) estimates the overall gross rate of return on 
capital in the United States. Hartman states that even though this term seems similar to 
the first term, it serves a different purpose. In particular, second rate of return variable is 
applicable to firms, which are acquiring existing assets. The third term, (1-t)/(1-t) 
measures the tax rate on United States' capital owned by foreigners. This has also defined 
as net of tax rate of return received by domestic investors relative to that received by 
domestic investors on the same investment. 
In short, after tax rate of return is meant to control for the expansion of c�rrent 
corporations and the net after rate of return on gross capital represents for acquisition of 
existing assets, while the relative term is included to capture the tax changes that 
applicable only to the United States investors. Since the first two terms are expressed in 
linear form he expects positive coefficients for the rates of return variables. A positive a 1
and a2 would support the hypotheses that United States taxes would have a negative 
effect on foreign direct investments. Hartman expects to capture the valuation effect by 
coefficient a3. In other words, he controls for the tax change that causes investments to 
become more appealing to domestic investors but makes no change in cost to the foreign 
· investors.
The role of home country taxes was ignored in his analysis because foreign 
statutory corporate income tax rates have not varied much during the period. Hartman 
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further argues that home country taxes do not matter for the investments that come from 
the tax exemption countries. Not every type of investment is affected even in the case of 
investments from tax credit countries. As he argued, the home country taxes applied to 
United States source income plays no role in the firm's marginal investment decisions. 
Simply, only newly formed subsidiaries whose desired investment exceed earnings find 
that tax rates on repatriation of earnings matter. Therefore Hartman does not expect any 
detrimental effect on his results from this exclusion. 
Hartman estimates two separate regressions: one for the reinvested earnings part 
of investment (reinvested funds) and the other for the transfers from parent part of the 
investments (transfer funds). According to the author, the reason behind this 
categorization is that investment decisions of firms, which are reinvesting earnings at the 
margin, could be affected differently by transfer funds. Since repatriated profit is taxed in 
the home country, investors can decide to reinvest them rather than repatriati�g to the 
parent company. This would allow the subsidiary to defer its tax obligations. Hence, 
Hartman points out that United States tax impacts are different depending on whether the 
funds are already in this country in the form of reinvested funds or they are in the 
investing country in the form of transfer funds. 
He further suggests that the difference may also depend on whether the firm is 
established or an emerging at the time of investment decision is made. In general, mature 
firms have sufficient funds to invest in the form of reinvested funds. However emerging 
firms have to transfer new funds to their affiliates in the form of equities or loans. Hence 
for mature firms, the home country tax rate should not play a significant role in their 
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investment decision. These considerations motivated Hartman to analyze reinvested 
funds and transfer funds separately. 
Hartman finds that both reinvested funds and transfer funds are significantly 
correlated with the tax rates. However, he points out that reinvested funds have much 
more explanatory power than that of transfer funds. To illustrate, while the former 
explains more than 90 percent of the variation, the latter explains only 28 percent of the 
total variation of the dependent variable. Hence, the author suggests that his model 
should not be used for policy recommendation purposes, which involve transfers from 
parent component of FDI. However Hartman concludes that in general, his model 
provides strong evidence for the negative relationship between tax rates and foreign 
direct investments in the United States. 
Hartman's results were criticized on the grounds of a small sample size, omission 
of control variables to represent non-tax effects, and an imperfect specification of the 
model (Newlon 1987, Slemrod 1990). Several subsequent time series studies have been 
undertaken as a result of their effort to minimize the shortcomings of Hartman's paper. 
Boskin and Gale (1987) introduce several modifications into the Hartman 
analysis. In particular, they update the series including FDI data until 1984 and use the 
rate of return series calculated by Feldestein and Jun (1987) as explanatory variables. 
Further, t�ey try a different specification instead of relying on standard double log 
specification. For this purpose they estimate the model assuming both linear specification 
as well as double log specification. However, these modifications have been unable to 
produce significantly different qualitative results from those of Hartman. In other words, 
they confirmed the basic Hartman conclusion that tax rate changes explain reinvested 
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earnings investment better than transfers from parent component of FDI. Nevertheless, 
Boskin and Gale study emphasizes that results can still be somewhat sensitive to the form 
of specification and size of the sample. 
Newlon (1987) questions the validity of the data set that has used by Hartman 
(1984) and Boskin and Gale (1987). He points out that both of the above studies have 
miscalculated the rates of return data. Rates of returns were calculated by taking the ratio 
of total earnings of foreign owned corporations over total invested capital. This 
overestimates the rate of return data because total earnings consist of two components: 
reinvested earnings and repatriations. He also observes a spurious relation of the rate of 
return data. Newlon recalculates the rates of return data, but does not find a substantial 
difference in the results of previous studies. However, he reports a slight change in the 
explanatory power of the two equations due to this corrected series. While new data 
explains transfer funds better, reinvested funds do not fit as well. Then Newlon estimates 
transfer funds and reinvested funds equations for a longer data set from 1956 to 1984 and 
finds that both models fit very poorly. 
Young (1988) provides another time series analysis of the effects of domestic 
taxes and rates of return on FDI in the United States. He mainly expands Hartman (1984) 
analysis by using revised international investments and United States Gross National 
Product data for a longer (1953-1984) period. Similar to previous studies he refers to FDI 
as a financial transaction rather than real physical property and plant investments. 
Further, as Hartman and others, he uses realized rate of return data though he admits that 
expected rate of return data may be more relevant for the purpose. 
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The econometric model used by Young can be considered as a modified Hartman 
model. It is written as in the equation (1.2). 
ln(FDI)= a





Notations are the same as in Hartman (1984) except there are two additional 
regressors. GNP is included to control for the non-tax variables, while lag FDI term is 
meant to capture short run variations. Specifically, if we restrict last two coefficients to 
one and zero, respectively then this model is identical to Hartman (1984). 
Previous studies added an arbitrary constant to the observed investment data to 
construct log linear model. However, Young prefers to omit the observations with,
negative values and then proceeds to estimate log linear model. In 1974, the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis the official data collection agency for foreign investments changed 
._I 
the definition of FDI. Young included a simple dummy variable to represent this change 
but found the variable was statistically insignificant and hence dropped it from the final 
specification. 
Young compares results with those of earlier studies. In general, results are 
similar to those of Hartman (1984) and Boskin and Gale (1987). However, he points out 
that the results obtained by dropping negative values are much better than results derived 
using constructed values that have obtained by adding arbitrary constant to all 
observations. According to Young, an insignificant and small value of the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable indicates that the adjustment process is 
immediate. 
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Empirical results for transfer funds are extremely poor. The model is not able to 
explain even a quarter of the variation of the dependent variable. Hence, he questions the 
ability to use tax variables to explain FDI inflows in the United States because transfer 
funds themselves contributed approximately 60 percent of the total FDI inflows at the 
time of his study. However, Young's results suggest that if one wan.ts to focus only on 
reinvested funds, then he or she can satisfactorily use the Hartman analysis to understand 
the taxation and FDI issue. 
Based on his regression results, Young reports a higher (-1.81) tax rate elasticity 
for FDI through reinvested earnings, and a lower (-0.47) elasticity for FDI through 
transfers from parent component of FDI than do earlier studies. This study also indicates 
that tax incentives generated by the 1981/1982 tax reforms have increased FDI in the 
United States substantially. 
Murthy (1989) points out that Young's regression results are quite misleading due 
to the presence of autocorrelation between the residuals in the time series data. Murthy 
re-estimates Young's model to adjust for the presence of autocorrelation. Specifically, he 
uses a maximum likelihood estimation instead of Ordinary Least Squares. Applying 
various types of tests such as Durbin h-test, Durbin m-test and Lagrange multiplier test he 
rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
Murthy describes two possible ways to correct for the autocorrelation problem. 
One is t.o use the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure and the other is to use maximum likelihood 
estimation. However, Murthy explains that the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is not 
advisable here because Young's model includes a lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable. This will lead to inconsistent and sometimes biased estimates. On 
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the other hand, maximum likelihood estimators are consistent in larger samples and are 
more efficient than the ordinary least squares estimators. 
Although the general findings are quite similar, the overall tax rate elasticity in 
Murthy (1989) is much larger than Young's (1988) elasticity. To illustrate, the long run 
tax rate elasticity for the reinvested funds in Murthy is -0.7, while Young's estimate is 
- 0.32. The same is true for the short run elasticities. However, Murthy' s results seem
statistically superior to those of Young due to several reasons. First, standard errors are 
smaller. Second, adjusted R2 is slightly higher. Third, most of the coefficients have the 
expected sign. Unlike reinvested funds, results based on transfer funds are not 
comparable between two studies. For instance, Murthy emphasizes that long term overall 
tax rate responses for transfer funds are elastic while Young maintains that they are 
inelastic. 
Arguably, after Hartman, the most important time series studies on taxation and 
foreign direct investment is Slemrod (1990). It is worthwhile to have a fair amount of 
discussion about his methodology and results. Slemrod criticizes the earlier results in the 
literature for several reasons and introduces some modifications to improve the results. 
First, he suggests that since FOi data consist of measurement error we have to 
correct for them before we undertake any kind of estimation. Measurement error occurs 
due to the way the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) collects data. BEA collects data 
using benchmark surveys. This method of collection is likely to make more errors when 
farther away from the benchmark years. To control for this data discrepancy he includes a 
drift term, which is equal to the number of years elapsed since the previous benchmark 
survey of FOi conducted by the BEA. Second, improvement is also related to the data 
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definition issue. It is known that the BEA changed the definition of FDI in 1974. 
According to the change, minimum ownership requirement that needs to be considered as 
FDI was decreased from 25 percent to IO percent. Previous studies except Boskin and 
Gale (1987), have not taken this into consideration when they estimate the model. In 
order to account for this, Slemrod includes a dummy variable for post 1974 observations. 
Third, he uses marginal effective tax rates that were derived by Auerbach and Hines 
(1988) to estimate tax coefficients. Fourth, he introduces some non-tax variables such as 
relative gross national product, unemployment rate of prime age males, and real exchange 
rate into the analysis. Fifth, he uses lagged tax term as an explanatory variable in his 
estimation. According to Slemrod, because of the time it takes to implement an 
investment decision, there may be a lag between changes in the tax rate on FDI. 
With all these adjustments, he finds completely opposite results from those of 
Hartman and previous researchers. In other words, Slemrod finds that only transfer fund� 
are significantly negatively correlated with tax rates. Results do not suggest a negative 
association between tax rates and retained earnings. Rather he finds a positive 
relationship between these two variables. He does not provide any reason for the 
significantly positive correlation between corporate income tax rate and reinvested funds. 
Although the inclusion of non-tax variables improves the explanatory power of the 
model, he finds that the unemployment rate, the ratio of gross national product, and drift 
variables are not significantly different from zero. 
In the second part of the paper, Slemrod separates total FDI in the United States 
by investing country and controls for the tax system in the home country of the parent 
company. He expects that investors from tax exemption countries respond differently 
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than those from tax credit countries. He uses only statutory corporate income tax rates for 
the tax variables. However, outcomes of the regression do not provide convincing 
evidence to support the hypothesis. Surprisingly, his regression results on FDI using 
manufacturing sector investments indicate a significantly negative relationship with tax 
rates only for investments by United Kingdom and Japan, which adopt tax credit system. 
Most of the results in the latter part of the Slemrod study can be described as mixed 
rather than clear-cut results. 
While exiting studies largely agree on a negative correlation between corporate 
tax rates and FDI in the United States, they have not reached an agreement regarding the 
size of the tax effect. After reviewing the exiting literature, Hines (1997) finds that the 
tax rate elasticity is between -0.5 and -0.6. However, Mooij and Ederveen (2001) 
suggest that the mean value of the tax rate elasticity is considerably larger than that of 
Hines. 
Their calculation is based on a meta analysis of 25 published and unpublished 
studies on corporate taxation and FDI. Meta analysis refers to a statistical analysis from 
individual studies. It goes beyond a regular survey of the literature because it takes into 
account the underlying differences in study characteristics. This type of study is 
particularly useful for a review of FDI and corporate taxation literature for several 
reasons. 
First, the dependent variable is not the same in every study. As we have seen, 
researchers have expressed FDI as a ratio of some form of macroeconomic 
variablesWhen the dependent variable is different, it is not recommended to use 
coefficient of determ�nation to compare studies. Second, different studies use different 
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specifications, sample size, and non-tax variables. While some studies, such as Hartman's 
completely ignored non-tax variables, others (Slemrod, 1990) have controlled for some 
non-tax effects. 
In order to address these differences Mooij and Ederveen calculate the tax rate 
elasticity for some well-known studies under a uniform definition. Equation (1.3) 
displays the regression equation in their study. 
y = BX +E (1.3) 
where y represents the vector of elasticities and X is a matrix of dummy variables 
to control for different study characteristics. The semi-elasticity is defined as the 
percentage change in FDI in response to a one- percentage point change in tax rates. They 
provide a convenient way of transforming semi-elasticity into an ordinary elasticity. The 
ordinary elasticity is measured as the impact on FDI due to a one-percent change in the 
tax rate, while semi-elasticity measures the impact on FDI to a one-percentage point 
change in the tax rate. 
They conclude that the absolute mean value of the tax rate elasticity is quite 
large. To illustrate, the study suggests that one- percent reduction in the host country 
corporate income tax rate raises FOi in that country by 3.3 percent. Table 1.1 shows 
median and mean tax rate elasticity for some well-known time series studies on taxation 
and foreign direct investment. A good understanding about the tax rate elasticity is 
important because it has important welfare implications for an economy. Young (1988) 
provides a very good explanation of the welfare effects. Welfare effects associated with 
the impact of a tax change on FDI can be measured by studying the impacts on tax 
revenue. Theoretically, an increase in the tax rate will increase tax revenue provided tax 
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Table 1.1 
Tax Rate Elasticities 
Study Mean Median 
Semi-Elasticity Semi-Elasticity 
Hartman ( 1984) -2.6
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rates are inelastic. Since tax rate in the United States seems elastic, a reduction of the tax 
rate should increase tax revenue. Therefore, studies that estimate tax rate elasticities are 
useful for designing a tax policy that aims to enhance the welfare of the United States. 
Contribution 
There are two purposes of this study. The first is to investigate both long run and 
short run relationships between corporate income tax rates and FDI in the United States. 
A single equation based cointegration approach, suggested by Engle and Granger (1987), 
and multi-equation method of Johansen (1991) are used to analyze the long run 
relationship between tax rates and FDI. We distinguish between long run and short run 
tax effects by estimating an error correction model. This distinction is important because 
multinational investors generally do not respond to tax rate changes until they are assured 
that changes would not be reversed in a short period of time. The existence of a 
cointegration relationship would enable us to calculate both short run and long run tax 
rate elasticities. Findings can be compared with studies that have used traditional time 
series techniques. 
The second purpose is to determine whether different components of FDI respond 
differently to corporate income tax rate changes. Empirical studies distinguish between 
FDI that is financed by reinvested funds and transfer funds. Previous studies are not in 
agreement regarding the relative responsiveness of FDI components to corporate income 
tax rate changes. For example, Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Murthy (1989), 
and Young (1988) suggest that FDI from reinvested funds are more responsive to taxes 
than FDI financed by transfer funds. Slemrod ( 1990) and Cassou ( 1997) find the reverse 
to hold. 
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Several features of the present study represent improvements over earlier attempts 
to examine the responsiveness of FDI to changes in corporate income tax rates. First, this 
study uses modern time series techniques to identify effects of tax rates on FDI. Most 
importantly, we examine stationarity and cointegration properties of the series. As 
Granger and Newbold (1974) have shown, spurious results are often obtained when 
nonstationary variables are used to estimate a long run relationship. However, it is still 
possible to find a meaningful long run relationship with non-stationary time series 
variables if at least one cointegration relationship exists among the variables (Engle and 
Granger 1987). To our knowledge, previous studies have not used these techniques to 
estimate the effects of tax rates on FDI. 
Second, this study estimates short run dynamics of impacts of tax changes on FDI. An 
Error Correction Model (ECM) is used to illustrate short run dynamics of the mod�l. This 
approach will enable us to gather information about the length of time that foreign 
investors take to respond to changes in corporate tax rates and other control variables. In 
other words, adjustment parameter provides information about the length of time it takes 
to re-establish the long run equilibrium after a shock to the model. Furthermore, the 
existence of an ECM can be used to confirm the long run equilibrium relationship among 
the variables. 
A third improvement pertains to the type of corporate tax rate used to estimate the 
tax rate elasticity. Previous time series studies generally use some form of an effective 
marginal corporate income tax rate, while we use the statutory corporate tax rate. The 
effective marginal tax rate is commonly interpreted as a forward-looking measure of 
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investment incentives. According to Mackie (2002), this tax rate is a hypothetical tax 
rate that measures capital costs attributed to taxes on marginally profitable investments. 
Methods used to calculate effective tax rates are rather subjective because they involve 
assumptions regarding the inflation rate, depreciation rate, and so on. When estimating 
the real tax burden, effective tax rates should be used rather than statutory tax rates. Our 
purpose is to understand how foreign direct investors respond to changes in tax rates. 
Policymakers and investors probably know little about effective tax rates and base their 
decisions on statutory corporate income tax rates. Employing statutory tax rates will 
enable us to construct a data set spanning five decades to capture more variation in tax 
rates and FOi. This study would enable us to compare our findings with those based on 
effective marginal corporate income tax rates. 
Finally, we employ a larger sample size than used in earlier studies. Tax and FOi 
data for the period 1957-2002 will capture tax policy changes for five decades. Previous 
studies have used samples ranging shortest from 1965 to 1979 (Hartman 1984) and 
longest from 1953 to 1987 (Slemrod 1990). We also account for other important 
determinants of FOi such as the real minimum wage, imports, gross domestic product, 
and effective exchange rates. By capturing more variation over time and controlling for a 
variety of other FDI determinants, we expect to obtain more precise estimates of the tax 
rate elasticities. 
Empirical Strategy 
We use the same specification that has been used in the FOi and taxation 
literature to investigate the issue. In other words, this study investigates the relationship 
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between natural logarithm of FDI and natural logarithm of statutory federal corporate 
income tax rate (CITR) and other control variables. We apply modem time series 
techniques to analyze the following issues: 
1. Investigate whether a long run relationship exits between foreign direct
investment and corporate income tax rate in the United States.
2. Determine if the different components of FDI respond differently to the
changes in corporate income tax rate.
3. Investigate the short run dynamics of the model. More specifically, examine if
corporate tax rate changes incur any significant short run impacts on the
amount of inbound FDI to the United States.
It is standard in the time series literature to check for the unit roots in each series 
before estimating any equation. If there is a unit root, that series is considered to be non­
stationary because then it contains a stochastic component. Granger and Newbold (1974) 
point out that estimation based on non-stationary variables may lead to what they called 
spurious results. A spurious regression has a high R2 and t-statistics that appear to be 
significant, but the results are without any economic meaning (Enders, 2003). Following 
this guidance, this study begins the estimation procedure assessing the properties of each 
variable to determine if any of them are non-stationary. 
Although non-stationary variables can lead to spurious results, it is possible to 
obtain a linear combination of integrated variables ·that is stationary. Such a relationship 
is called a cointegration equation in the time series literature. A cointegration equation 
suggests a long run equilibrium relationship between the variables that move together. 
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Two methods are currently available for identifying cointegration relationships: Engle 
Granger cointegration test (1987) and a Johansen (1991) cointegration test. We use both 
of them even though Engle and Granger results are analyzed in greater detail. 
This study uses data that spans five decades. It is possible that some series have 
undergone permanent shifts during this period. Results could be misleading if we do not 
take structural breaks into account. It is especially so because some unit root tests such as 
Dickey-Fuller do not account for breaks in the series. This may have serious 
consequences because it generally leads to acceptance of the null of unit root in the series 
against the alternative. Hence, we use Chow test to identify any structural break in the 
series and then cointegration relationships are re-estimated with any possible break. 
Last step of the empirical method is to estimate the short run relationship between 
the variables under consideration. Here we specifically use the Error Correction Model .1 
(ECM) suggested by Engle and Granger (1987). The short run model serves several 
important purposes. First, it can be used to identify whether the tax effects are permanent 
or temporary. If tax responses are significant in the short run only, then the impacts of the 
changes in tax rates are temporary. On the other hand, if responses in both long and short 
run are significant, then we will have both transitory and permanent effects. Second, 
ECM can be used to confirm the outcomes of the cointegration equation. According to 
the Granger Representation Theorem, for any integrated of order one, I (1) variables, 
error correction and cointegration are equivalent representations (Enders, 2003). Finally, 
ECM provides information about the speed of adjustment in response to a deviation from 
the long run equilibrium, which can be very useful for the policy analysis. 
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Data Definitions and Sources 
This paper examines the inbound FOi flows for the US economy over the period 
1957-2002. Annual data for FOi and other explanatory variables are needed for 
estimating the models outlined in the previous section. Following the literature, I rely on 
the FDI data provided by the BEA. It provides total FDI data, which includes reinvested 
earnings by subsidiaries of foreign parents and transfer funds from the parent company to 
the US firms. FDI data pertaining to the 1957-1987 period are obtained from Young 
(1988) while data for the other years are drawn from various issues of the Survey of 
Current Business, which is published by the BEA. Figures on total foreign direct 
investment (FOi) transfer funds (TFDI) and reinvested funds (RFOI) are expressed in 
millions of US dollars. TFDI and RFDI cover the period 1957-1999 while FDI covers a 
slightly longer period 1957-2002. 
In order to assess tax responses, the top corporate income tax rate (CITR) is used. 
Only federal corporate income tax rates are utilized and hence no inferences should be 
deduced regarding the state corporate income tax impacts on inbound FOi. CITR data 
are obtained from the various issues of US Master Tax Guide. Following Slemrod (1990), 
one-year lag corporate income tax rate is also used as an explanatory variable in this 
study. 
The series for gross domestic product (GDP) and prime interest rate (INT) have 
been collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's FRED II database. GDP are 
provided in real terms using 1996 dollars while nominal interest rate variable is expressed 
in terms of percentages. 
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Data for the other control variables are obtained from several different sources. 
For instance, total annual US imports (IMPORT) are directly from the Council of 
Economic Advisers' Economic Report of the President, February 2003 issue while real 
minimum wage rate (MWR) data are extracted from the mimimumwage.com web site4 • 
Source for the effective exchange rate (EEXR) data is the various issues of International
Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund. EEXR data are based 
on 1995. A decrease in this index reflects a real depreciation of the US dollar. 
Unit Root Tests 
There are several tests available to determine if any series are stationary or 
whether the series contain a unit root. We utilize the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and Phillips-Perron (PP) test (Phillips-Perron, 1988) in this 
study. Under both of these tests, the null hypothesis is the existence of unit root. 
Therefore, an acceptance of the null means the series is non-stationary. General structure 
of the ADF equation is given in equation (1.4).
!!:..y, = µ+ yt+t5Y,-1 + �!!:..Y,-1 +£, (1.4) 
i=k 
Three different specifications of ADF tests are available. The first specification 
excludes both trend and intercept terms in which, both µ and y are restricted to zero. The 
second specification includes intercept but excludes trend term, so only y is restricted to 
zero. The third one includes both trend and intercept term. The ADF test is an 
improvement of the original Dickey-Fuller unit root test (DF). Unlike ADF, DF assumes 
4 http://www.minimumwage.com 
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that the errors are independent and have a constant variance. However, if the true data 
generating process contain an autoregressive component, we may not be able to obtain 
proper estimates using DF unit root test. So, ADF test controls for possible higher order 
lags including k lags of first differences of the dependent variable to the right hand side 
of the equation. 
Therefore, one of most important steps of the ADF test is to select the appropriate 
lag length. As Enders (2003) points out, too few lags mean that the residuals do not 
behave like a white-noise process. Including too many lags reduce the power of the test to 
reject the null of a unit root because more lags lead to loss of degrees of freedom. There 
are several methods available for selecting the appropriate lag length. Here we use two of 
the most popular tests: Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, 1974) and Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criterion (SBC, 1978). AIC and SBC are computed using the form of 
equations (1.5) and (1.6) respectively. 
AIC = -2LIT + 2K IT
SBC= -2LIT + 2K(logT)/T 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
Lis the value of the maximized value of log likelihood, K is the lag length, and T 
is the number of observations. Adding any lag has an advantage and a disadvantage. It 
will decrease the value of the first term of AIC, but increase the value of the second term. 
So, adding an additional lag continues until the marginal cost equals marginal benefit of 
doing so. In other words, the appropriate lag length is chosen such that AIC achieves its 
minimum value. SBC has the same strategy, but imposes a larger penalty for including 
additional variables. Such a penalty system causes SBC to select a more parsimonious 
model than the AIC. However, AIC in general is better for small samples whil� SBC is 
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superior for large samples. Since these two methods have produced contradictory results 
regarding the optimal lag length, this study arbitrarily uses one lag for testing unit roots. 
It is not uncommon to use only one lag in annual data. Results indeed show that the errors 
obtained from each unit root test are white noise suggesting that one lag is sufficient to 
approximate the true data generating process. 
The PP test is different from ADF unit root test because it controls for the 
autocorrelation to represent true data generating process better .. It omits the lagged first 
difference terms and undertakes a non-parametric correction to the t statistics. Both the 
ADF and PP methods test the null hypothesis of a unit root in the series. Throughout this 
study, the Newey-West (1987) procedure is used for estimating the equations because it 
gives a more consistent covariance estimator in the presence of unknown 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The results of both unit root tests are given in 
Table 1.2. Results clearly indicate a unit root in each series suggesting they are non­
stationary. On the other hand ADF and PP tests for the first differences of the variables as 
given in Table 1.3 show that they are stationary. Existence of a unit root in each variable 
requires us to test for the cointegration because it is still possible to have a long run 
equilibrium relationship between the variables in spite of this non-stationarity problem. 
Cointegration Test: Engle and Granger Approach 
Though the variables themselves are non-stationary, it is possible to have a linear 
combination of integrated variables that is stationary. In time series literature, such 
variables are called cointegrated variables. There are several alternative ways to test for 
cointegration. This study uses the most popular Engle and Granger ( 1987) procedure as 
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Table 1.2 
Unit Root Tests 
Variables in Levels 
Variable ADP Test Statistic PP Test Statistic 
5% CV=-3.52 5% CV=-3.52 
Reinvested Funds -1.49 -2.22
Transfer Funds -1.86 2. 61
Total FDI -3.10 -2.71
CITR -3.10 -2.32
GDP -0.59 -0.58




Note: ADP and PP test the null of a unit root. One lag is used in both 
tests. Results are reported for constant and trend specification only. 
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Table 1.3 
Unit Root Tests 
Variables in First Differences 
Variable ADF Test Statistic PP Test Statistic 
5% CV=-3.52 5% CV=-3.52 
Reinvested Funds -4.93 -7.77
Transfer Funds -5.56 -7.58







Note: ADF and PP test the null of a unit root. One lag is used in both 
tests. Results are reported for constant and trend specification only. 
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the primary test. However, a Johansen test for cointegration (Johansen, 1991) is also used 
to confirm the primary results. Single equation based Engle and Granger approach 
defines the cointegration as follows. 
Suppose there are two time series Yt and Xt that are both integrated of order d and 
denoted by, I (d). If there exits a vector�' such that the disturbance from the regression is 
of a lower order of integration, I ( d-b ), where b>O, then Engle and Granger ( 1987) define 
y1 and x1 as cointegrated of order d and b (Harris and Sollis, 2003). In this study, since all 
the variables are I ( 1 ), the series would be cointegrated if the disturbance term from the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is integrated of order zero, I (0). T�ere are two important 
steps in this test. First, we estimate the best possible linear equation for total FOi and two 
other components of FDI using OLS to capture the residuals. Then ADF and PP tests are 
used to test whether residuals contain a unit root. If the residuals do not contain a unit 
root, we determine that the cointegration relationship exists and continue with the long 
run analysis. The cointegration equations are given in equations (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9), 
respectively. 




= Po + P1CITR, + L pix, + E, 
i=2 
7 





FOi, TFOI, and RFOI denote total foreign direct investment, transfer funds and 
reinvested funds respectively and X represents non-tax explanatory variables. In order to 
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test for whether the above three equations represent any long run equilibrium 
relationship, we use the ADF test. However, Engle and Granger (1987) advocate ADF of 
the form given in equation (1.10). 




Where, e1 are the residuals from the cointegration equations. In this test we assume 
that µ and cS are zero because we have already included deterministic components of 
constants and trend terms in the cointegration equations. Deterministic components can 
be added to either the long run equation or error term equation, but not to both (Harris 
and Sollis, 2003). 
Empirical Long Run Results 
Table 1.4 presents results of the cointegration relationship for all three types of 
foreign direct investments separately. Table 1.5 gives ADF and PP unit root test results 
for the residuals. Results indeed suggest that the variables share a long run equilibrium 
relationship in each equation. Since there are three foreign direct investment equations in 
this study, discussion of results is carried out in the order in which they appear in the 
Table 1.4: total FDI, transfer funds, and reinvested funds, respectively. 
Column 2 of Table 1.4 presents results of the cointegration relationship between 
total FDI and the explanatory variables. As expected, the corporate tax rate exerts a 
significant negative effect on FDI inflows to the United States. Results suggest that a 
one- percent decrease in the corporate tax rate would increase total FDI in the U.S. by 2.4 
percent. This finding is similar to those of other studies shown in Table 1.1. The 
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Table 1.4 
Engle and Granger Cointegration Results 
Variable Total FDI Transfer Reinvested Funds 
Funds 
Constant -56.2568 -24.065c -62.332
(11.600) (13.566) (47.144) 
CITR -2.425c -4.220a 1.698 






(l.164) (1.719) (1.922) 
GDP 5.8133 2.180 5.473 
(l.341) (1.428) (4.297) 
IMPORTS 1.6378 1.422b 0.537 
(0.434) (0.617) (1.011) 
MWR -l.107c -1.363 0.804 
(0.646) (0.856) (0.798) 
INT 0.7413 0.8388 -0.038
(0.202) (0.258) (0.361) 
EEXR -0.022 1.279 -0.450
(0.771) (1.154) (1.492) 
Adjusted R2 0.978 0.967 0.265 
Durbin-Watson 2.220 2.019 1.663 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 8Significant at the 1 % level. 
bSignificant at the 5% level. cSignificant at the 10% level. Linear and non-
linear time trend are also included as explanatory variables in the 
regression. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table 1.5 
Unit Root Tests: Error Term 
Variable ADF Test Statistic PP Test Statistic 
5% CV=-2.93 5% CV=-2.93 
Errors of reinvested Funds -6.09 -7.58
Errors of transfer Funds -5.48 -5.03
Errors of total FD I -4.83 -6.44
Note: ADF and PP test the null of a unit root. One lag is used in ADF and 3 
lags are used in PP test. Results are for no constant and no trend 
specification only. 
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similarity of tax rate elasticities across studies suggests tax rates used in these studies are 
highly correlated. Using the statutory corporate tax rate in the place of the effective 
corporate tax rate results in an elasticity that is similar to the average value of the 
elasticities shown in Table 1.1. This is consistent with the literature. Mooij and Ederveen 
(2001) find that studies using marginal effective tax rates yield higher elasticities than 
studies that adopt statutory tax rates. More important message is that corporate tax rate 
changes can have a significant long run effect on the amount of inbound FDI of the 
United States. This is a critical finding because the majority of studies on the 
determinants of FDI completely ignore the tax effects. The validity of those studies can 
be questioned on the ground of omitted variable bias. 
Although we are primarily interested in the relationship between the current 
corporate tax rate and FDI, it is interesting to note that the coefficient on the lagge'd tax 
rate variable is positive and significant. This is consistent with Slemrod's (1990) 
findings. 5 Interpreting the coefficient of lag tax rate requires assuming that all the other 
variables including current tax rate remains unchanged. An increase in the lagged 
corporate tax rate implies a relatively smaller current rate, which should attract more FDI. 
On the other hand, a decrease in lagged tax rate, holding current tax rate constant implies 
a relative increase in current rate, which should reduce FDI inflows. Therefore, a positive 
relationship between lag tax rate and FDI is quite understandable and statistically 
consistent. 
5 Slemrod (1990) finds the one-year lag corporate tax rate elasticity is 4.28 for the 1960-1987 period.
Elasticities are found to differ considerably across specifications and time periods. 
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GDP and FDI are positively and significantly related in the long run. GDP 
appears to be one of the most important determinants of FDI. This is particularly true for 
the U.S. because it has the largest domestic market of any country. This proves largely 
accepted market size hypothesis regarding determinants of FOi. It says that foreign 
investors take into account the size of the host country market when. they make 
investment decisions. The theoretical foundation for this argument can be traced back to 
Balassa (1966). Producing in a larger market will enable investors to exploit economies 
of scale and also achieve higher sales. Casual observation of the GDP and FDI series 
alone would confirm this finding. In the late l 990s when the economy was growing at a 
very healthy rate the U.S. experienced a huge increase in FDI inflows. Figure I.I and 1.2 
illustrate this close relati9nship growth rate of FDI and that of GDP over the last five 
decades. 
The factor endowment approach to the determinants of FDI implies that FDI 
generally flows from one country to another because the former has a comparative 
disadvantage in the relevant industry. Due to its larger market, imports are a particularly 
important determinant of FDI for the United States. However, whether trade encourages 
FDI is still an unanswered question. Some view FDI as an alternative to trade. So, foreign 
companies that export goods and services to the U.S. may sometimes find it is more 
profitable to produce within market rather than exporting them. This generally happens 
after they establish their product with the domestic consumers. Producing in the foreign 
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restrictions, and dumping duties. A good example is Honda's establishment of production 
facilities in Ohio to circumvent the tariffs and voluntary export restraints imposed by the 
U.S. (Moosa, 2002). However, some empirical studies have found a positive relationship 
between FDI and trade, suggesting they are working as complements rather than as 
substitutes to each other. 
This study finds a significantly positive long run relationship between U.S. 
imports and inbound FDI. Complementarity between FDI and trade arises from a variety 
of sources. U.S. affiliates' sales and U.S. imports both deliver foreign goods and services 
to U.S. consumers. Foreign goods are important inputs into affiliate manufacturing. 
Greater sales in foreign markets will require improved distribution systems, advertising, 
and R&D activities that are facilitated by FDI inflows. Further, this result is in line with 
the recent studies on FDI (Billington, 1999). 
Results also reveal a positive relationship between the interest rate and FDI. We 
hypothesized that FDI and interest rates would be negatively correlated. Cost of capital is 
one of the most important determinants of any type of investments regardless of whether 
they come from foreign or domestic sources. The interest rate can be considered as a 
good proxy for the cost of capital. The differential rates of return hypothesis suggest that 
international capital flows from one country to another until all rates of return advantages 
are exhausted. Earlier studies such as Hartman (1984) and Young (1988) have not used 
the interest rate as an explicit variable. However, studies that use statutory corporate 
income tax rates for representing tax impacts choose to include the interest rate explicitly 
into the model (Billington, 1999). Billington also reports a positive coefficient for the 
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import variable. Increased inbound FDI can be associated with higher U.S. interest rates 
when multinationals borrow in the source country rather than in the United States. 
Specifically, higher interest rate in the U.S. encourages foreign investors to borrow from 
the home country capital market and invest in the U.S., which suggest a direct 
relationship between the two variables. 
The real minimum wage rate is included to control for the cost of labor in the host 
country. Differences in wages can cause significant location-related differences in the 
costs of production. The theoretical foundation is provided by eclectic theory (Dunning, 
1981) as well by the location hypothesis developed by Horst (1972). Studies that 
empirically test for the wage effect oftentimes include unit labor cost to represent wage 
differentials and find a negative relationship betw�en labor cost and FDI inflows 
(Cushman 1987, Chakraborty and Basu 2002). The real minimum wage is better suited 
to represent wage impacts and this is the first known study that includes it as an 
explanatory variable. Results indicate a significantly negative relationship at 10 percent 
level confirming the findings of existing literature. 
The currency area hypothesis implies that the foreign exchange rate can be 
significant variable for determining inbound FDI. However, the exchange rate can affect 
FDI in different ways. If the investor targets the host country market, then appreciation of 
local currency would lead to increase in FDI inflows. On the other hand, if the investor 
were planning to export its product, then depreciation of the host country exchange rate 
would encourage FDI. Froot and Stein (1991) suggest that the depreciation of the United 
States' dollar after 1985 had been the major reason for the unprecedented increase in FDI 
39 
inflows into the United States in late 1980s. The effective exchange rate is included in 
this study to test the currency area hypothesis. Results fail to establish any significant 
relationship between the two variables. Though surprising, this finding is consistent with 
some well-known studies (Slemrod, 1990). 
Cointegration results for transfer funds are shown in Column 2 of Table 1.4. 
Transfer funds and the corporate income tax rate display a significant negative long run 
relationship. This relationship is stronger than the total FDl-tax relationship discussed 
earlier. Currently, transfer funds account for more than 90 percent of total FDI flows. The 
corporate tax rate elasticity for transfer funds of -4.22 is considerably larger than the -2.4 
value reported for total FDI. Once again, the coefficient on the lagged tax rate variable is 
positive and significant. Coefficients on imports and the interest rate are positive and 
significant, as is the case with total FDI. Time displays a positive and significant non­
linear trend and a negative and significant linear trend with transfer funds. Our 
specifications for total FDI and transfer funds result in much higher coefficients of 
determination (adjusted R2) than that reported by other studies. 
Results in the final column of Table 1.4 pertain to reinvested funds. The 
coefficient on the current tax rate is not significant. These findings counter results 
reported by Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Murthy (1989), and Young (1988), 
but are consistent with findings of Slemrod (1990) and some panel studies (Cassou, 
1997). Once again, the coefficient on the lagged tax rate is positive and significant. None 
of the other key determinants exert significant effects on reinvested funds. Time has a 
positive non-linear relationship with reinvested funds. 
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Slemrod (1990) and the present study find the tax rate is an important determinant 
of transfer funds, but not reinvested funds. Earlier time series studies find that the 
opposite holds. The changing composition of FDI flows might account for the different 
findings reported by these studies. During the 1953-1968 period, reinvested funds 
accounted for more than 50 percent of total FDI in the United States. The share of FDI 
attributed to reinvested funds has fallen over time. By 1999, reinvested funds accounted 
for about 7 percent of total FDI. Studies that include at least two or more non-tax 
variables find transfer funds are responsive to tax rates while reinvested funds are not. It 
is possible that when non-tax variables are dropped from the regression, the coefficients 
could capture the responses of those omitted variables distorting the pure tax responses. 
Later, we conduct robustness tests such as regression specification and structural break 
tests to investigate why studies result in different tax elasticities for the various 
component of FDI. 
As previously stated, this essay relies on the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure 
to analyze cointegration relationships between corporate income tax rate and various 
components of FDI. Although this is the most popular and one of the easiest methods to 
apply, it has several limitations. The test requires considering one variable as the 
dependent variable and the others as explanatory variables. However, it is possible to find 
that one regression indicates that the variables are cointegrated, whereas reversing the 
order indicates no cointegration (Enders, 2003). Another disadvantage of the procedure is 
that it ignores the possibility of more than one cointegration relationship. When there are 
more than two variables in the model, there can be more than one-cointegration 
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relationship. Specifically, if there are n variables, it is possible for up to n-1 cointegration 
vectors to exist in the model. Single equation based Engle and Granger procedure 
produces inefficient results if there are more than one-cointegration relationships. Hence, 
it is necessary to check for potential multi-cointegration vectors using alternative 
cointegration tests. The following section uses the Johansen ( 1991) procedure to 
investigate this matter. This procedure allows for,inore than one cointegration vector, 
preventing any efficiency loss. 
Johansen Cointegration Test 
This procedure uses two methods to determine the number cointegrating vectors 
in a system. They are the so-called eigenvalue test and trace test. Both methods rely on 
the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to reach conclusions. The general form of the 





+ .... + Apx,_P + E,
p-l 
ta, = nx,_1 + Ln,.t:a,_; + E,
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Where x, is (nxl) and each of the Ai is an (n x n) matrix of parameters. Equation 
(1.12) is derived from the unrestricted VAR model given by equation (1.11). Matrix 7t is 
the most important term in this presentation. Rank of 7t is equal to the number of 
cointegrating vectors in this model and it identifies the long run relationship of the 
variables. It is also equal to the number of characteristic roots in the matrix 7t. For 
example, if rank or characteristic roots of matrix 7t is equal to one, there is only one 
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cointegration relationship in the system Null hypothesis in the trace statistic method, is 
the number of distinct cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to some specific number, 
say r, where r = 0, 1,2 ... etc. Maximum-eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r 
cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r+ 1. For instance, it tests r =0 against the 
alternative of r = 1 etc. According to Chakraborty and Basu (2002), if there is any 
divergence of results between these tests, it is recommended that one should rely on the 
evidence based on the maximum-eigenvalue test since the results of the latter are more 
reliable for small samples. Tables 1.6 through 1.8 give results of the Johansen test for 
total FDI, transfer funds, and reinvested funds. 
Both the trace statistic and max-eigenvalue statistic clearly shows a single 
cointegration relationship in each equation. This suggests the Engle and Granger single 
equation method is appropriate for estimating cointegrating relationships. Normalized 
cointegrating coefficients for all three types of foreign direct investment are given in the 
Table 1.9. These results are qualitatively similar to findings that based on Engle and 
Granger cointegration procedure. For example, both tests indicate that in the long run, the 
corporate tax rate exerts a significant negative effect on total FDI and transfer funds, but 
not on reinvested funds. This justifies the single equation method and also implies that 
results are robust. More standard robustness tests will be carried out in the latter part of 
this essay. The next section investigates whether the results would change once structural 
breaks are allowed to enter the model. 
43 
Table 1.6 
A: Johansen Cointegration Test: Total FDI 
Trace Statistic 
Number of cointegration Trace Statistic 5% Critical 1 % Critical 
equations Value Value 
None 
•• 
135.73 124.24 133.57 
At most 1 85.03 94.15 103.18 
At most 2 49.75 68.52 76.07 
Note: *(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1 %) level. 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both 5% and ·1 % levels. 
Table 1.6 
Continued 
B: Johansen Cointegration Test: Total FDI 
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic 







At most 1 35.28 39.37 
At most 2 22.47 33.46 





Note: *(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1 %) level. Max­




A: Johansen Cointegration Test: Transfer Funds 
Trace Statistic 
Number of cointegration Trace Statistic 5% Critical 1 % Critical 
equations Value Value 
None 
•• 
140.68 124.24 133.57 
At most 1 91.10 94.15 103.18 
At most 2 52.65 68.52 76.07 
Note: *(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1 % ) level. 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both 5 % and 1 % levels. 
Table 1.7 
Continued 
B: Johansen Cointegration Test: Transfer Funds 
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic 







At most 1 38.45 39.37 
At most 2 24.26 33.46 





Note: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1 ro) level. Max­




A: Johansen Co integration Test: Reinvested Funds 
Trace Statistic 
Number of cointegration Trace 5% Critical 1 % Critical 
equations Statistic Value Value 
None 
••
143.62 124.24 133.57 
At most 1 92.06 94.15 103.18 
At most 2 51.85 68.52 76.07 
Note: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1 % ) level Trace test 
indicates 1 co integrating equation at both 5 % and 1 % levels. 
Table 1.8 
Continued 
B: Johansen Cointegration Test: Reinvested Funds 
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic 
Number of cointegration Max-Eigen 5% Critical 1 % Critical 
equations Statistic Value Value 
None 
• 
51.55 45.28 51.57 
At most 1 39.37 40.21 45.10 
At most 2 24.31 33.46 38.77 
Note: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1 % ) level. Max-
eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level. 
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Table 1.9 
Johansen Cointegration Results 
Variable Total FDI Transfer Reinvested Funds 
Funds 
CITR 16.434 13.930a -22.213





(2.628) (3.195) (3.027) 
IMPORTS -4.167a -3.761a 1.571 
(0.732) (0.923) (0.729) 
MWR -3.130b -1.874 3.101 
(0.646) (l.542) (1.331) I 
INT 1.124b 1.636 2.235 
(0.570) (0.750) (0.622) 
EEXR -14.107 -12.156a 8.328 } 
(0.771) (3.175) (2.026) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. aSignificant at the 1 %level. 
bSignificant at the 5% level. cSignificant at the 10% level. Lag corporate 
tax rate is not included in the VAR specification.Variables are in natural 
logs. 
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Cointegration Relationships with Structural Break 
This study uses data that spans five decades. For a longer data set, it is customary 
to check for the potential structural break of the model. The Chow test (1960) is used for 
this purpose. The Chow structural break point test separates the sample into sub samples 
and examines whether there are significant differ�nces in each estimated equation. 
Existence of a difference indicates a structural break in the relationship. This can be 
tested using either F-statistic or log likelihood ratio statistic. This study uses log 
likelihood ratio statistic. It compares the restricted and unrestricted maximum value of 
the log likelihood function. The test statistic has a x,2 distribution with (n-1 )lk degrees of 
freedom under the null of no structural change in the relationships. 
Researchers, including Hartman ( 1984) point out that it is 1981 tax reforms that 
spurred the interest of foreign companies of investing in the United States. Careful 
observation of the data set also confirms this notion. Accordingly, we use 1981 as the 
structural break point in the Chow test and the results are reported in the Table 1. 10. 
Results do not provide any evidence of structural break for the total FDI and transfer 
funds. However, test results regarding reinvested funds decisively reject the null 
hypothesis of no structural break. This further confirms the complex nature of reinvested 
funds components. Cointegration results for the reinvested funds in the presence of 
structural break are presented in the Table 1.11. 
Overall explanatory power of the regression has improved considerably once this 
break is included in the estimation. To illustrate, the cointegration equation now explains 
97 percent of the variation of reinvested funds for the period 1957-1980 and 73 percent 
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Table 1.10 
Chow Breakpoint Test 
Equation Log Likelihood Ratio Probability 
Total FDI 17.035 0.107 
Transfer Funds 32.097 0.073 
Reinvested Funds 34.372 0.000 
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Table 1.11 
Engle and Granger Cointegration Results with Break 
Variable Reinvested Funds Reinvested Funds 
1957-1980 1981-1999 

















Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. aSignificant at the 1 %level. 
bSignificant at the 5% level. cSignificant at the 10% level. Variables are 
in natural logs. 
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for the period 1981-1999. These new R2 values are considerably higher compared to the 
one obtained without imposing any break. However, as far as corporate tax effects are 
concerned, results are not much different after the break. Both current and lag tax rates 
are small and insignificant. 
Although overall explanatory power has improved as a result of the break, its 
usefulness is questionable because none of the coefficients are statistically different from 
zero for the period 1981-1999. Signs of some of the parameters also seem economically 
implausible. Hence, the model we are using seems well suited to explain total FDI and 
transfer funds, but it may not be appropriate to analyze reinvested funds. However, that 
should not be a factor to overlook the importance of findings of this essay because 
reinvested funds currently only comprises approximately 6 percent of total inbound FDI 
in the United States. 
Short Run Dynamics 
Long run relationship does not provide any information regarding the short run 
behavior and the adjustment process of the variables. Once existence of a long run model 
is established, it is easy to estimate the short run model applying the Engle and Granger 
(1987) Error Correction Model (ECM). According to the Granger representation theorem, 
co integration relationship guarantees an ECM, because for any set of I( 1) variables, error 
correction and cointegration are equivalent representations. If y1 and Zt are cointegrated 
( 1, 1 ), then the variables have ECM in the form given in given ( 1.13). 
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(1 .13 ) 
All of the regressors except the error correction term are expressed in first 
differences. This makes all of the terms in equation ( 1.13) are stationary or integrated of 
order zero. 
This procedure involves two important steps. The first step is to estimate the 
cointegration equation and capture the residuals. The second step estimates the error 
correction model as in equation ( 1.13 ). Equations ( 1.14) through ( 1.16) show the specific 
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ECT,raifer = TFDJ,_1 - (/30 + /31CJTR,_1 + L/3;X,_1 + E_11) 
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The ECM is practically important for many reasons. First and foremost, it 
provides an alternative test for any possible cointegration relationship between the 
variables. Statistical significance of the error correction term suggests such a meaningful 
relationship. Second, the magnitude of the coefficient of the error correction term 
contains important information regarding the dynamics of the system This coefficient is 
also known as the adjustment_ parameter. In order to analyze short run dynamics of three 





Short Run Results 
Variable Total FDI Transfer Reinvested Funds 
Funds 
Constant -0.342b 0.003 -0.329
(0.129) (0.089) (0.301) 
�CITR -1.852 -3.764
b 2.229b
(l.241) (1.557) (0.977) 
�CITR1-1 1.225 1.795
c 1.130 
(0.867) (0.999) (1.078) 
�GDP 5.418
b -0.015 9.652 
(2.131) (l.903) (7.104) ' 
�IMPORTS 1.779
8 1.0808 0.527 
(0.529) (0376) (0.409) 
�WR 
-0.664 - l.153c -1.364
.,I 
(0.739) (0.610) (l.749) 
�INT 0.469 0.530
c 0.121 
(0.291) (0.267) (0.352) 
�EEXR 
-0.439 0.089 1.074 




a -0.938Adjustment Parameter 
(0.178) (0.219) (0.219) 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.50 0.53 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 8Significant at the 1 % level. 
bSignificant at the 5% level. cSignificant at the 10% level. Variables are in 
natural logs. 
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As expected, the cof]X)rate tax rate exerts a significant negative effect on transfer funds in 
the short run. A one percent decrease in the U.S. tax rate would increase the level of 
transfer funds in the U.S. by 3.7 percent. We find significantly positive short run 
coefficients for imports and interest rate, while minimum wage rate display a significant 
negative relationship. We find a significant positive short run relationship between the 
tax rate and reinvested funds. This finding counters our expectations although Slemrod 
( 1990) and other studies have reported positive long run relationships between tax rates 
and FDI.6 Scholes and Wolfson (1990) attribute this finding to tax policies in the capital­
exporting country. 
For example, if investors are from a country that adopts tax credit system it may 
not be surprising to find a positive association between host country cof]X)rate tax rate 
and inbound FDI. Tax credit countries tax worldwide income and give credit for foreign 
taxes paid. Suppose J apailese investors face a 35 percent cof]X)rate income tax rate in the 
U.S. and a 40 percent tax rate at home. A small increase in the U.S. tax rate, with an 
unchanged Japanese tax rate, will favor Japanese firms who still pay 40 percent at home 
while domestic U.S. investors pay a higher rate. lb.is might be one of the reasons for this 
positive relationship between reinvested funds and U.S. tax rate. 
A significantly negative coefficient on the adjustment parameter in all three sets 
of results reported in Table 1.12 confirms our findings of the cointegration relationship. 
This is required to assure a meaningful relationship between variables. Testing the 
significance of the speed of adjustment coefficient is another way to show that the model 
6 For example, Swenson's (1994) panel data study found a median tax rate elasticity of 2.7. 
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converges to steady state solution. 7 Adjustment to the long equilibrium completes within 
one-year period except for reinvested funds, in which only 93 percent of the 
disequilibrium is corrected during one-year period. 
Robustness Check 
Several diagnostic tests are used t? detennine whether results are robust. This 
includes autocorrelation tests, and regression specification tests. Satisfactory performance 
against these tests undoubtedly raises the level of reliability of the findings. Cointegration 
and error correction estimation results are valid only if the residuals of the equations are 
white noise. Serially correlated residuals have been identified as a frequent reason for 
encountering non-white noise error problem 
This study uses the Breusch-Godfrey LaGrange Multiplier (LM) test to check for 
serial correlation. It is more suitable because unlike the Durbin-Watson statistic, the LM 
test can be used to test for higher order serial correlation problem which is common in 
time series studies. This test captures residuals from each of cointegration equation and 
then estimates the error equation using the general form given in equation ( 1.17). 
Residuals are regressed on original explanatory variables and residuals up to a certain 
number of lags. The product of the number of observations and R2 is called Breusch­
Godfrey LM statistic. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation against the alternative 
is tested using this statistic. 
e, = x,r + cf a,et-k) + m,
k=l 
7 
See Harris and Sollis (2003). 
(1.17) 
55 
Results are shown in Table 1.13. Results do not indicate a serious serial 
correlation problem for the total FDI and transfer funds at the 5 percent level. However, 
residuals for the reinvested funds are serially correlated. This further strengthens the 
previous findings of this essay that reinvested funds are rather difficult to analyze using 
simple time series techniques. 
A Regression Specification Test (RESET) suggested by Ramsey ( 1969) is used to 
detennine whether the specification of the model is correct. RESET is widely used to 
check for an incorrect functional form, omission of relevant explanatory variables, and 
simultaneity problems. Specification errors can lead to a non-zero mean for the 
disturbance term that will result in biased estimates. RESET estimates the original 
cointegration equations including powers of the predicted values of the dependent 
Variable. If the original specification is correct, then these new terms should not add 
significant explanatory power to the new model. The null hypothesis of no specification 
error is tested using log likelihood ratio. 
As reported in Table 1.14, RESET suggests the specification is correct for the 
transfer funds and total FDI regressions. However, it rejects the null of no specification 
error in the case of reinvested funds. This may clarify why some studies find reinvested 
funds are not responsive to tax rates. Incorrect specification may contribute to the poor 
performance of the reinvested funds equation. More research is required to detennine the 
correct specification for reinvested funds. This finding does not obscure the importance 
of the FDI tax rate relationship because reinvested funds are only a small part of total FDI 
in the United States. 
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Table 1.13 
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test Results 
Equation Obs*R2 P-Value
Total FDI 5.525 0.063
Transfer Funds 0.797 0.671
Reinvested Funds 6.356 0.041
Table 1.14 ' 
RESET Test Results 
Equation Log Likelihood Ratio P-Value
,.' 
Total FDI 2.411 0.120
Transfer Funds 0.944 0.331
Reinvested Funds 34.352 0.000
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Conclusions 
This essay investigates long run and short run relationships between corporate 
income tax rates and FDI in the United States. The corporate income tax rate is found to 
exert a significant negative effect on total FDI inflows in the long run. Th.is long run 
relationship is confirmed by the Engle and Granger ( 1987) single equation procedure as 
well as the VAR approach adopted by Johansen ( 1991) cointegration test. Results suggest 
that a one percent decrease in the tax rate would increase total FDI in the U.S. by 2.4 
percent. This finding is similar to results reported in earlier studies that use different tax 
rates and FDI measures. We did not confinn a significant short run relationship between 
tax rates and total FDI flows. However, it is important to note that a cointegration 
relationship is not confirmed once non-tax variables are excluded from the model. So, it 
is the combination of tax and other non-tax variables that make this relationship. 
Tax rates exert significant negative effects on transfer funds in both the long run 
and short run. Tax rate elasticities are quite large, ranging in absolute value from 3. 7 in 
the short run to 4.2 in the long run. In the long run, investors have more time and 
infonnation to respond to tax rate changes. Currently, transfer funds account for more 
than 90 percent of total FDI in the United States. Therefore, these findings are 
particularly important for policy analysis. 
We did not find a significant long run relationship between tax rates and 
reinvested funds. An incorrect specification and a structural break contribute to this 
finding. A significant positive short run relationship is established between the tax rate 
and reinvested funds. Earlier studies that report similar positive relationships between tax 
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rates and FDI attribute their findings to the combined effects of foreign country and U.S. 
tax policies. 
Collectively, results suggest that foreign investors are highly responsive to 
corporate income tax rates used by the United States. This suggests the U.S. has 
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Essay Two 
An Empirical Assessment of the Impa·cts of Host Country and Home 
Country Corporate Tax Rates on FDI in the United States 
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Introduction 
This essay investigates the effects of host country and home country tax policies 
on the amount of FDI flows into the United States. Studies on the detenninants of FDI 
have largely ignored home country tax rates. However, this issue is becoming more and 
more relevant due to the so-called race to the bottom tax competition among 
industrialized countries. The tax-cutting trend is continuing throughout the world and 
particularly in industrialized countries. Not a single OECD member country raised its 
corporate income tax rates in the year 2001. Instead, twelve members cut their rates 
(KPMG, 2002). The gap between tax rates is shrinking and quickly converging to a 
harmonized rate. For instance, between 1988 and 1997, the OECD average statutory 
corporate tax rate declined from 44 percent to 36 percent (Gropp and Kostial, 2001), 
which is just one percent higher than current U.S. corporate income tax rate. One of the 
. 
} 
most probable reasons for this tax-cutting trend is to attract mobile capital such as foreign 
direct investment from other locations and to keep domestic investors from moving out of 
the country. However, if a country introduces tax policies to attract foreign capital 
without paying due attention to this interrelationship, it may find that it is hard to realize 
its expectations for achieving the targeted amount of foreign mobile capital. 
In addition to examining home country tax rates, this study also examines the 
impacts of different taxation systems on the amount of FOi inflows to the United States. 
It is known that foreign investors are subject to corporate income tax in the host country 
and then upon repatriation, the profits can also be taxed in the home country. In order to 
alleviate this double taxation, countries use two types of relief methods. One is called a 
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territorial taxation system in which investors are completely exempted from home 
country taxation. The other method is called a worldwide taxation system in which 
capital-exporting countries provide a tax credit for the taxes paid in the host country. 
Following literature, we refer those countries that use territorial system as exemption 
countries and those that use worldwide system as credit countries. So, it is expected that 
investors from tax exemption countries be more sensitive to tax rate changes in the U.S., 
while investors from tax credit countries be more responsive to tax rate changes in their 
home country given home country tax rates are higher than host country tax rates. 
This study uses a panel of nine investing countries: Canada, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Italy, Japan,, and the United Kingdom over the 
period 1982-2000. The first five countries in the list adopt the tax exemption system 
while the rest follow tax credit system These nine countries altogether contribute more 
than 85 percent of total US FDI inflows during the sample period. 
This study attempts to address two timely questions regarding corporate taxation 
and foreign direct investment in the United States. First, it investigates whether the 
corporate income tax rate is an important determinant of FDI in the United States. 
Compared to essay one, which is a time series analysis, we expect a better estimate for 
the tax rate elasticity because a ·panel allows for the inclusion of both host and home 
country tax rates. Second, we ask if investors from tax credit countries significantly 
differ in their tax response relative to those from tax exemption countries. 
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Literature Review 
As pointed out in essay one, earlier time series studies have not incorporated 
home country tax rates into their analysis. Slemrod (1990) is the first time series study 
that controls for the tax system of the home country. Using FDI data for 3 credit 
countries and 4 exemption countries, Slemrod estimates tax rate elasticity to see if 
investors from tax exemption countries respond differently than those from tax credit 
countries. He tests the hypotheses that FDI from exemption countries should be at least as 
sensitive to U.S. tax rates as FDI from tax credit countries, and FDI from exemption 
countries should be positively related to the rate of home country taxation. However, he 
does not find convincing results to accept or reject these two hypotheses. Limitations of 
the econometric procedure that he uses may be one of the explanations for his 
inconclusive results. It would have been better if he used panel estimation techniques 
rather than estimating separate time series equations for each country. However, many 
still consider this as a pioneering work because it is the first study that emphasizes the 
importance of incorporating home country tax rates into the FDI and taxation literature. 
Cassou (1997) makes an effort to extend Slemrod's work by using a panel data 
empirical approach. Using a panel of six investing countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), he investigates the impact of tax policy on 
foreign direct investment flows between the U.S. and other countries. The use of a panel 
approach enables him to include more non-tax variables such as the unemployment rate 
and interest rate into the analysis. With these modifications, he finds strong evidence 
regarding a negative relationship between U.S. corporate tax rate FDI inflows. His results 
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suggest that home country corporate income tax rate exerts a significant effect on 
investment flows. Unlike Slemrod, he finds that some non-tax variables such as the 
exchange rate and unemployment rate are significant detenninants of FDI. However, he 
does not differentiate between tax credit and tax exemption countries. 
Swenson (1994) questions the so-called negative relationship between tax rates 
and FDI in the United States. Her doubt is based on the general equilibrium results 
derived by Scholes and Wolfson (1990). They point out that in some cases, it is possible 
that foreign investors increase their investments in response to higher U.S. corporate 
taxes. To empirically test this hypothesis, she uses industry level FDI data from tax credit 
and tax exemption countries. Unlike previous studies, she uses the average tax rate 
instead of marginal or statutory corporate tax rates. Further, her study controls for one­
year lag tax rate and exchange rate variables. Two separate equations are estimated: one 
for the tax credit countries and the other for tax exemption countries. As expected, the 
study finds positive tax elasticity for the investments from tax credit countries. Moreover, 
she concludes that the surge in FDI in the United States in the 1980s was driven by tax 
changes rather than changes in macro economic variables. Swenson has another 
interesting finding regarding the relationship between tax rates and FDI. They are 
positively related when average tax rate is used, but negatively related once the effective 
marginal tax rate is used. To explain this anomaly, she separates FDI data into two major 
categories; manufacturing industry, and combined industry. This study shows that only 
manufacturing industry data retain the positive coefficient under both types of tax rate 
data. Swenson also suggests that th� average tax rate is a better indicator than the 
70 
effective marginal tax rate of the tax response to FDI because the latter is extremely 
sensitive to macroeconomic variables such as the interest rates and depreciation rates. 
Over the years, studies have contributed to the literature by extending the analysis 
of taxation and FDI in various ways. To illustrate, some studies investigate the impact of 
state corporate income tax rates on the allocation of FDI in the United States. Hines 
(1996), uses the data from seven investing countries into 50 U.S. states to examine the 
effect of sub national taxes on investment location decisions. He uses real investment 
data rather than financial flows to study this issue and also controls for the different tax 
systems of investing countries. Hines's study finds that foreign investors from tax 
exemption countries are considerably more responsive to state taxes than are investors 
from tax credit countries. The study finds that investors from tax exemption countries 
reduce their investment shares by approximately 10 percent for every one- percent 
change in state corporate tax rate. Although an elasticity of that magnitude is 
questionable, his results support findings of previous important studies, which suggest 
that state taxes have significant effect on business locations within the United States 
(Papke, 1991). Since Hines is using single year data, it is possible that results are due to 
time specific features rather than to general outcomes. Agostini and Tulayasathien (2003) 
examine the effects of state corporate income taxes on the location of foreign direct 
investment using PPE data for five years. Following Hines, they also use top marginal 
statutory corporate tax rates to measure state tax impacts and include FDI data from tax 
credit countries as well as tax-exempt countries to control for the foreign tax system 
However, they use a discrete choice model to estimate FDI equations. They find that FDI 
is sensitive to state corporate income tax rates. However, they find that the tax rate 
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elasticity for credit countries is not statistically different from the one for exemption 
countries. Another investigation of state tax effects is presented in Swenson (2001). She 
separates FDI into six different components: Establishment of new plants, plant 
expansions, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, equity increases, and other FDI. 
Then she estimates separate equations for each components. The study uses data from 46 
countries into 50 U.S. States. One significant feature of the study is the use of number of 
investment projects instead of the value of investment flows. Swenson finds a significant 
negative relationship between the state corporate income tax rate and FDI in each 
equation. Results for some of the other variables differ across equations. 
Recently, some studies have found a different approach to measure the effects of,
taxation of foreign direct investments. Instead of using inbound FDI data, they use 
outbound FDI data to evaluate tax impacts of tax rate changes on FDI flows. For 
instance, Cummings and Hubbard ( 1994) examine tax sensitivity of a panel on American 
companies abroad for the period of 1980-1991. lbis is the first known study that has used 
micro level firm data instead of aggregate data for the empirical part. They estimate two 
equations. Equation one is estimated including corporate tax rates as an explanatory 
variable and equation two is estimated excluding tax rate. They expect to see implausible 
parameters in equation two if tax rate is an important determinant in investment decision. 
The study finds that American investors are less sensitive to host country tax rates 
because of the tax credit system used by the United States. 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) also use FDI data of American multinational firms 
to investigate the impacts of taxation on the location of foreign investments. Particular 
attention is given to tax competition and the role of chains of ownership. Under the 
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chains of ownership, affiliates are owned indirectly through other affiliates rather than 
owned directly by a parent. As discussed before, the United States follows a tax credit 
system of taxing its own citizens who conduct business overseas. Therefore, American 
companies are sensitive to both host country as well as U.S. corporate tax rates. 
However, chains of ownership can be used to reduce the tax burden of home country 
taxes. In this case, they hypothesize that investors from tax credit countries are more 
sensitive to foreign tax rate differences. 
Based on data of American companies between 1982-1997, Desai, Foley and 
Hines show that investment patterns of indirectly owned affiliates are considerably more 
sensitive to local tax rates than that of directly owned foreign affiliates. Results also 
indicate a different level of tax sensitivity between American and non- American firms. 
The difference is due to different methods of tax systems used by the countries. Though 
the U.S. adopts a tax credit system, many other countries use the tax exemption method. 
Most of the studies have used U.S. data to investigate the relationship between 
corporate tax rates and FD I. However, there are some studies that use FD I data of other 
countries to understand the issue. For instance, Billington (1999) uses the statutory 
corporate income tax rates to estimate the tax rate elasticity. He uses direct investment 
data from seven investing countries into the United Kingdom Unlike the studies that 
based on the U.S. data, Billington uses a number of variables to control for the non-tax 
determinants. He includes gross domestic product, imports, and expenditure on 
transportation, interest rate, and unemployment rate as explanatory variables. This study 
uses similar steps that have adopted by the studies that use U.S. data. As explained 
before, Hines (1996) investigates the impact of state tax changes on FDI behavior. 
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Similarly, Billington estimates a multi-region model to investigate whether local 
determinants are any different from country level determinants. Regional dummies were 
also included. Since FDI data are not available at regional levels, Billington uses the 
annual number of foreign investment projects that were started in each of regions as a 
proxy variable. Further, his study does not use any regional tax rat�s because they are 
determined at the national level rather than at the local level. At the regional level, some 
non-tax variables, such as unit labor costs and unemployment are the most significant 
factors. 
The majority of the existing studies on taxation and foreign direct investment are 
focused on FDI inflows in a single country. Quere, Fontagne, and Revil (2001) address 
this gap in the literature by undertaking a multi-country analysis. Findings based on the 
information of a single host country are harder to generalize because they may. have taken 
place due to some host specific effects. Using a panel of bilateral FDI flows across 11 
OECD countries over the 1984-1996 period, they investigate the role of tax differential 
between countries on foreign investments. 
This paper provides a nice empirical analysis of the impact of tax rate differentials 
on FDI inflows. It uses both statutory and effective marginal corporate income tax rates 
for the estimation. Tax differentials are measured as the tax difference between two 
countries. Tiris study also controls for different taxation schemes such as credit and 
exemption methods. They use a better way to handle tax credit and tax exemption issue in 
their analysis. To illustrate they set the tax differential to zero when the investor comes 
from a credit scheme country as long as host country tax rate is lower than that of the 
source country. As in Young (1988), this study also includes a lagged dependent variable 
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because they suspect that the whole history of taxation, and not just current taxation, 
matter for foreign investors' decision to relocate their capital. They report a significantly 
negative tax rate elasticity. As far as different tax systems are concerned, they find that a 
credit system would reduce fiscal incentives to relocate. Further, the study implies that 
tax harmonization is not the solution for the harmful tax competition among countries. 
Results also refute the popular notion that smaller countries are in a better 
position when it comes to the tax competition. Citing agglomeration-related factors, they 
point out that a small peripheral country should. display substant.ially lower tax rates in 
order to compensate for distance to investors and low market potential. Even after 
controlling for the agglomeration factors, this study finds that tax rates play a significant 
role determining location of foreign direct investments. According to them, this is true as 
long as different tax schemes such as credit and exemption systems are controlled for. 
Gropp and Kostial (2001) study the link between FDI and corporate tax revenues 
in addition to corporate tax rates. This is the first known study that estimates the 
relationship between tax revenue and FDI in a host country. Previous studies have mainly 
focused on some form of corporate income tax rates rather than revenues. Their study 
finds a strong relationship between the two variables. Their sample covers 13 countries 
for the period 1988-1997. Another interesting feature of this study is to estimate the 
effects of home country tax rates on FDI outflows. They·observe that tax exemption 
countries experience larger outflows than credit countries. 
Wei (2000) contributes to the literature by using FDI .stocks rather than flows. He 
uses FDI stock data from 12 source countries to 45 host countries. Another improvement 
of the study is to control for the corruption level in the host country. He finds that one-
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percent increase in the top statutory marginal corporate income tax rate reduces inward 
FDI by 4.8 percent. In order to control for the different tax systems of the countries he 
includes an interaction of the tax rate and a dummy. The dummy takes on the value of 1 
if the source country adopts tax credit system Results yield no significant difference in 
tax responses to different taxation schemes of home countries. 
Mooij and Ederveen (2001) point out that comparison among the above studies is 
difficult because specifications and data sets are different. In order to alleviate these 
difficulties, they conduct so-called meta analysis for some well-known studies. This 
investigation support of the view that investors from tax exemption countries are more 
likely to respond to changes in host country taxes than do investors from tax credit 
countries. Specifically they find semi-elasticities that pertain to the former group are 2.16 
times larger compare to the studies that �o not specify the home country of the investor. 
However, they also find inconsistent results regarding the effects of different taxation 
systems of home countries. To illustrate, the semi-elasticity for investors from tax credit 
countries is 0.56 larger compared to the studies that do not specify the home country of 
the investor. This finding is inconsistent with the theory. 
Theoretical Background 
Neoclassical trade theories such as the Hecksher-Ohlin theory explicitly assume 
factors of production are immobile. These theories focused on trade in goods and not 
trade in factors. Over time, more attention has been devoted to international factor 
mobility. Mundell (1957) incorporates trade in factors into the model and shows that 
trade in goods and, factor inputs can work as substitutes for each other. These 
developments in international trade theories had a little influence on public finance 
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policies8• As Gordon and Hines (2002) point out, the assumption of a closed economy 
was widely thought to have been an adequate approximation of the US economy over 
much of the postwar period. How_ever, tax policies based on closed economy assumption 
are no longer considered appropriate. 
This essay investigates how foreign investors take tax policies of both countries 
into consideration in deciding where to locate their mo bile capital. This is a particularly 
interesting issue for foreign direct investors because they are required to pay corporate 
taxes in the host country and then in the home country upon repatriation of profits to the 
parent company. However, not all the countries adopt the same policy of taxing their 
residents' foreign source income. Currently countries follow two distinct approaches of 
taxing foreign source income. Countries such as Canada, Germany, and Netherlands 
follow an exemption system, while the U.S., Japan, and the United Kingdom follow a tax 
credit system 
If home country adopts an exemption system, its investors have to pay only host 
country taxes. Therefore, they should be more concerned about changes in host country 
corporate tax rates and less sensitive to tax rate changes in the home country. With the 
perfect capital mobility assumption, investors from tax exemption countries should 
achieve equal after tax rate of return in the equilibrium (Swenson, 1994). 
Tax credit countries follow a worldwide system of taxing foreign source income. 
Sometimes, this method is also called a residence-based taxation system This system 
allows investors to claim credit for the corporate taxes they paid in the host country. In 
8 However. Diamond and Mirrlees ( 1971) discusses about the difficulties that arise when taxing returns to capital 
investment in open economies. 
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other words, they have to pay the difference between the host tax rate and the home 
country rate. For example, the top corporate income t� rate in Japan is 42 percent while 
the U.S. adopts a 35 percent rate. As both countries adopt credit system, a Japanese firm 
that earns 1,000 dollars in the U.S. pays 350 dollars corporate income tax in the U.S. and 
an additional 70-dollar yen equivalent Japan. 
If the host country tax rate exceeds the home country rate, then that country 
should be considered an exemption country. For example, in Ireland, the current top 
corporate tax rate is 16 percent. Therefore, an Irish firm that operates in the U.S. has to 
pay only U.S. corporate taxes. This situation is called excess foreign tax credit. Our
sample mainly consists of tax credit countries that face a deficit foreign tax credit rather 
than an excess foreign tax credit. In other words, tax liability in the host country is 
smaller than that of home country. Under this situation, an increase in the host country 
.I 
corporate tax rate can have a subtle effect on FDI inflows. Consider our earlier example· 
on this page and, suppose that the U.S. raises its top corporate income tax rate to 36 
percent. Then the Japanese firm now pays 360 dollars in the U.S. and 60 dollars in 
Japan. Its total tax liability remains the same. The Japanese firm may even be in a 
favorable position compared to domestic investors as well as to investors from tax 
exemption countries. This research investigates whether we have sufficient empirical 




This essay addresses two major issues in the taxation and FDI literature. First, it 
investigates whether corporate tax rate changes can affect the amount of FDI in the 
United States. Both host and home country tax rates are included. This is important 
because it has been shown that tax systems in capital exporting countries substantially 
affect investors' decision of where to locate their investments. A fixed effects model is 
used to estimate the panel that consists of nine countries and 19 years of data. In addition, 
random effects and constant coefficient techniques are also used as a means of checking 
the accuracy of our findings. 
Second, this essay investigates whether investors' decisions are affected by the 
various taxation systems used in their own countries. As explained before, we control fo·r 
the different tax systems by including countries that adopt tax credit system and countries 
. .• 
that adopt tax exemption system Our sample consists of 4 tax credit and 5 tax exemption 
countries. The original sample is separated into these two groups and then estimated to 
determine whether results are significantly different from each other. 
Investors from tax exemption countries should have a stronger negative response 
to changes in U.S. corporate tax rates compared to those who come from tax credit 
countries. On the other hand, a stronger negative response is expected for the changes in 
home country taxes from investors that come from tax credit countries. The above 
mentioned panel estimation techniques are used to analyze these two hypotheses. 
Tiris study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this is the first study 
that uses panel estimation techniques to analyze impacts of home country tax systems on 
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financial flows of FDI into the United States9• Cassou (1997) is the only study that talces 
both home and host country tax rates into account, but he does not control for the
different tax systems of home countries.
The second improvement is our use of a more comprehensive data set. The most 
recent study, covers FDI and tax data only thorough 1970-1989 (Cassou 1997). This 
limitation is critical because we have witnessed a considerable change in tax rate changes 
by major investing countries as well as a remarkable increase in FDI inflows in 1990s. 
This essay consists of data for nine countries over the period 1982-2000, enabling us to 
capture all significant changes in tax policies during the last two decades. 
A third improvement pertains to the type of corporate rate used to estimate the tax 
rate elasticity. Previous studies have generally use only one form of the corporate tax 
rate. There are three popular corporate income tax rates in the literature, namely, top 
statutory marginal rate (SCTR), effective marginal rate (EMCTR), and effective average 
tax rate (EACTR). Both EMCTR and EACTR are based on tax codes and other variables 
such as interest rate and depreciation rate. Researchers are not in agreement regarding 
which taxes should be used for estimating the tax rate elasticity. This study uses all three 
forms of tax rates and compares findings. 
Finally, this essay controls for other important determinants ofFDI. Compared to 
time series studies that are confined to a small data set, a panel study has the advantage of 
including more relevant variables. Previous studies have not made use of this feature and 
are almost always limited to a very few explanatory variables such as gross domestic 
product, exchange rate and unemployment rate. Even studies that controlled for the non-
9 Slemrod ( 1990) uses time series techniques to analyze this issue. 
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tax detenninants have been unable to include them together in a single study. This essay 
controls for all the explanatory variables that have shown to be significant in separate 
studies. In addition to the above variables, I include bilateral trade, unit labor cost, 
interest rate, and a proxy for the infrastructure, and relative gross domestic product to 
control for non-tax detemrinants. 
Empirical Strategy 
This study use panel estimation techniques to estimate the model. A panel 
approach has a number of advantages over single time series or a cross section method of 
estimation. It allows researcher to use more observations and have a larger numbers of 
degrees of freedom This allows the inclusion of more explanatory variables, which may 
lessen the omitted variable bias. It also lets the researcher investigate new issues that are 
impossible under pure cross sectional or time series studies. Another advantage of using 
panel estimation is related to distribution properties of test statistics. To illustrate, 
Dickey and Fuller ( 19 81) points out that if time series are nonstationary, then even if the 
sample size reaches infinity, distributions of OLS parameters are no longer normally 
distributed. However, a panel, which comprises independent cross sectional units, may 
produce asymptotically normal distributions. In addition to these benefits, a panel 
approach is especially important for this study because it has been shown that pure time 
series studies have produced weaker results compared to panel studies (Ederveen and 
Mooij, 2001). 
There are three main methods that one can use to estimate a panel. The easiest 
among them is the so-called constant coefficient method. In this method all time series 
and cross section observations are combined and then ordinary least squares is applied to 
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the entire data set assuming both regressions slope coefficients and intercepts are 
identical across countries and over time. This study uses data from 9 countries over 19-
year period. The general form of the linear model is given in the equation (2.1 ). 
FDI;, =a;,+ 13;,x;, + c;
1 
where, i = 1,2,3 .......... 9 t = 1,2,3, ........ .19 
(2.1) 
a. and Wit are 1 x 1 and 1 x k vectors of constants that vary across time and
countries. Xi, is a lx k vector of explanatory variables and ei, is the error term10• 
Throughout this analysis, we assume that parameters are constant over time. This is a safe 
assumption because our sample uses data that spans no more than.two decades. With this 




where, i = 1,2,3 .......... 9 t = 1,2,3, ........ .19 
(2.2) 
This general form varies according to the specific model used to estimate the 
panel. Equation (2.3) displays the constant coefficient model that ignores any country­
related differences. 
FDI;, = a + /3'X;, + c
u 
where, i = 1,2,3 .......... 9 t = 1,2,3, ........ .19 
(2.3) 
However, if the observations are not independent and differences exist between 
cross sectional or time series observations, this method may lead to false inferences. This 
single OLS regression generally produces biased estimators. Hence, an analysis of 
covariance test is conducted to detennine the homogeneity of regression coefficient. If 
10 See Hsiao (2003) for detailed information about panel estimation techniques. 
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the test rejects overall homogeneity we have to account for that because heterogeneity 
bias may lead to meaningless results. Inconsistent and economically meaningless results 
arise due to the omitted variables that could explain heterogeneity in the model. Fixed 
effects and random effects models make necessary changes to the intercept term to 
account for this heterogeneity. 
In a fixed effects model, heterogeneity is taken care of by including dummies to 
capture cross sectional specific effects or time specific effects. This method captures 
systematic differences by raising or lowering the intercept term by a fixed amount for 
each cross sectional units. Therefore, the fixed effects estimator allows the intercept to 
vary across cross sections, though each country's intercept stays constant over time. In 
the literature, this model sometimes called least squares dummy variable model. Equation 
(2.4) displays the specific form that we use to estimate fixed effects model. 
FDI;, =a;+ p;x;, + £;,
where, i = 1,2,3 .......... 9 t = 1,2,3, ........ .19 
(2.4) 
A fixed effects model is easy to estimate and analyze. However, it has some 
limitations. The major problem is that it uses a large number of dummy variables that 
reduce the degrees of freedom Further, results are not suitable to make out of sample 
predictions. These problems can be lessened by using a random effects model. 
The random effects model treats omitted individual specific factors as random 
variables rather than constant terms. This model implies that unknown country specific 
factors are better explained through an error term rather than a constant. Hence, the error 
term is comprised of a traditional error term as well as a cross section specific constant 
term intercept term of each cross section comprises common constant term as well as a 
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cross section specific random variable. Equation (2.5) illustrates random effects model 
that we use in this study. 
FDI;, = µ + /J�X;, + V;, (2.5) 
where, i = 1,2,3 .......... 9 t = 1,2,3, ........ .19, and vit =a;+ A,+ e;, 
a.,-N(O, o,,_2), A,-N(O, o/) , and E;,-N(O, o/) represent the cross section error 
component, the time series error component, and the combined error component, 
respectively. The variance ofFDI;, can be expressed as Otdi2 = o/ +o;..2 +o/, a sum of 
error components. For this reason a random effects model is also called an error 
components model (Balestra and Nerlove, 1966). Due to our previous assumption ofno 
time specific effects, Oi,.2 becomes zero. We further assume that the individual error 
components are uncorrelated with each other and they are not correlated with explanatory 
variables. 
Both fixed and random effects models allow the intercept term to differ across 
cross sectional units. However, the random effects model often assumes that the 
distribution of the cross sectional specific error term is normal, w bile the fixed effects 
model does not impose such restrictions. When the pool contains data for many years, 
both models should produce similar results. In the case where the pool is small, random 
and fixed specifications can lead to significantly different results. A fixed effects 
estimator has an advantage over a random effects estimator because it does not require 
assuming effects are independent of explanatory variables. If, in fact, covariance of 
explanatory variables and cross section specific effects are zero, then the random effects 
model produces unbiased, consistent and efficient results. If it were not the case, then 
random effects estimator generates biased and inconsistent estimates. This pro bl�m does 
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not arise in the fixed effects model. In other words, the fixed effects model always 
produces consistent estimates, despite being relatively inefficient if effects are not 
constant. 
This study utilizes both panel estimation techniques with a particular emphasize 
on fixed effects results. This preference is mainly due to a technical problem that arises in 
estimating random effects models. In order to estimate a random effects model, it is 
required that the number of cross section units be higher than the number of coefficients 
in the model. Since we have data for only 9 investing countries, we may not be able to 
utilize random effects model unless one variable is dropped from the regression. Our 
strategy here is to drop the variable for which the statistical t-value is less than one. If 
there is more than one such variable, then the variable with the least t-value will be 
dropped from consideration. The fixed effects model does not suffer from this limitation 
and allows us to make use of all theoretically relevant variables in the analysis. 
We also estimate a GLS version of fixed effects model and constant coefficient 
model as a way of correcting for a possible heteroskedasticity problem As explained 
above, a fixed effects model is more appropriate for our purpose because it does not 
involve such restrictive assumptions as the random effects model. For practical sense, a 
random model is more appropriate if the researcher is expecting to make predictions 
outside the sample and the sample does not contain all existing cross sectional units. The 
data sample covers more than 85 percent of total FDI data into the United States. This 
makes it less likely that results will be used to make out of sample predictions. Therefore, 
fixed effects model is appropriate for our purpose. Nevertheless, we use results of 
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random effects model for comparing and contrasting with results of other alternative 
models. 
Since this study uses three forms of corporate tax rates (statutory marginal, 
effective marginal, effective average), separate equations are estimated for each. This will 
enable us to compare the results and determine which tax rate matters most for foreign 
investors. Finally, the sample is divided into tax credit and tax exemption groups and 
utilizes similar techniques to study impacts of different tax systems on foreign investors' 
behavior. 
Data Definitions and Sources 
Tiris study examines effects of host and home country corporate tax rates on FDI 
flows into the United States. A panel of nine countries covering the years 1982-2000 is 
used to estimate econometric models. The panel consists of 5 tax exemption countries 
and 4 tax credit countries. All the variables are expressed in natural logs11• 
The dependent variable is the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
U.S. from each investing country. FDI are given in millions of dollars. For this study, 
FDI data were obtained from OECD international Direct Investment database. In order to 
assess tax responses on FDI inflows, three types of corporate income tax rates are used. 
They are: the statutory corporate income tax rate, effective marginal corporate income tax 
rate, and effective average corporate income tax rate. All tax data were taken from 
International Fiscal Studies (2002) publications.12 
11 A constant is added to the FDI series to make the log transfonnation feasible. This strategy is very common in 
the literature (Hartman, 1984, Slemrod 1990, Cassou 1997). 
12 IFS has obtained original data from Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002). 
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Sum of top federal corporate income tax and average local corporate income tax 
rate is defined as the statutory corporate income tax rate. To illustrate, this study adds 
extra 4 percent to the U.S. top federal corporate income tax rate to incorporate influence 
of state corporate income taxes. Effective marginal and average tax rates have been 
calculated under a number of different assumptions. Both rafes assume that FD I is 
financed by transfer funds or reinvested earnings. However, there are some rate-specific 
assumptions. To illustrate, authors consider real interest rate and depreciation rates as 
fixed. However, they use country and time specific rate of inflation in calculating 
effective marginal effective corporate income tax rate. They further, assume a fixed 10 
percent rate of economic profit for calculating effective average corporate income tax 
rate. 
Data for other explanatory variables were obtained from various sources. To 
illustrate, information on GDP and telephone line per 1000 people was taken from IMF 
world economic database. We use OECD database for information on bilateral trade and 
unit labor costs data, while data for other control variables were obtained from the 
Federal Bank of St. Louis's FRED II database. Below, we briefly describe explanatory 
variables and economic reasoning for their inclusion as well as expected signs for tax and 
non-tax coefficients. 
Three types of host country tax rates along with their home country counterparts 
are used in this analysis. As far as whole sample is concerned, we expect FDI to be
negatively correlated with the host country corporate tax rate and positively associated 
with the home country tax rate. 
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These results may differ once different tax systems are allowed to enter the 
model. For example, we anticipate a less severe negative effect or even a positive impact 
from the investors from tax credit countries for a change in the U.S. tax rate. Conversely, 
investors from tax exemption countries should respond strongly to tax rate changes in the 
U.S. because they pay only U.S. taxes. As far as home country taxes are concerned, we 
expect an insensitive response from tax exemption countries and a completely opposite 
response from tax credit countries. 
Horst's location hypothesis (1972) as well as Dunning's eclectic approach (1981) 
suggests that wage rate differences affect location decisions by multinational 
corporations. Empirical evidence largely supports this notion (Culem, 1988, Chakraborty 
and Basu, 2002). This argument does not take account of labor productivity differences. 
For example, industrialized countries boast a relatively more skilled labor force than 
other countries. Therefore, high labor costs can be somewhat offset by higher 
productivity. Some researchers find no statistically significant evidence to prove that 
labor costs is a significant determinant of FDI flows into the U.S. (Wheeler and Mody, 
1992). Still, higher labor costs should discourage foreign investors from other 
industrialized countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Gennany. So, we expect 
a negative relationship between unit labor costs and FDI inflows. 
Market size hypothesis suggests that multinational companies always evaluate the 
size of the host country market when considering a location. This is particularly true for 
the U.S. because it has the largest domestic market of any country. The ratio of host 
country GDP to the home country GDP is included in this study to control for the market 
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size hypothesis. We expect to see a positive association between relative GDP and FDI 
in the United States. 
There are two arguments regarding the relationship between trade and FDI. One 
group considers trade and FDI as compliments while some take them as substitutes. If 
they are compliments, then higher trade between two countries should be associated with 
larger FDI inflows to the U.S. and if they are substitutes, higher trade should reduce 
inbound FDI. The substitution argument is based on the findings that a multinational will 
locate production operations close to its markets and FDI will substitute for trade if trade 
costs are not negligible (Quere, Fontagne, and Revil, 2001). However, foreign goods are 
important inputs into affiliate manufacturing. Greater sales in foreign markets will require 
improved distribution systems, advertising and R&D activities that are facilitated by FDI. 
Some studies find evidence for both substitution and complementarity effects (Blonigen 
2002). We expect to find a positive correlation between FDI and bilateral trade. 
Foreign investors pay particular attention to infrastructure available in a host 
country when determining whether a subsidiary should form there. A better infrastructure 
should encourage investment; therefore, we should control for this to avoid an omitted 
variable problem. A practical problem is to determine what variable should represent 
infrastructure in the host country. In general, some form of transportation or 
communication variable is used as a proxy to the infrastructure. Some studies use proxies 
such as per capita energy consumption, urbanization index, or expenditure on road 
transport (Billington, 1999). This paper uses telephone line availability per 1,000 
customers as a proxy for the infrastructure. We hypothesize a positive coefficient for this 
variable. 
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This study includes the bilateral exchange rate as an explanatory variable. It has 
been observed that foreign investment rises as dollar depreciates and falls as the dollar 
appreciates (Swenson 1994). Empirical evidence generally supports this view. For 
example, Froot and Stein (1991) point out that the depreciation of the United States dollar 
after 1985 had been the major reason for the unprecedented increase in FDI inflows into 
the United States in the late 1980s. Using both FOi inflows and outflows Cushman 
(1987) fmds that currency appreciation decreases FDI inflows. Although a large majority 
of studies supports this notion, findings are not unanimous (Slemrod, 1990). 
Difference in the cost of capital is regarded as a potential determinant of FDI 
inflows. We use the U.S. prime interest rate to control for the cost of capital. In addition, 
it can be a proxy for the rate of return that investors earn. According to the differential 
rate of return hypothesis, international capital flows from one country to another until rate 
of return advantages are exhausted. Intuitively, an increase in the cost of capital should 
decrease investment in that country. We expect to see a negative relationship between the 
interest rate and FOi inflows, though some studies find completely opposite results 
(Billington, 1999). 
Econometric Results 
Table 2.1 presents results from the constant coefficient specification. It ignores 
the time and cross sectional dimensions by assuming intercept and slope coefficients are 
constant. Any time and cross sectional effects are captured by the error term in the 
regression. For the sake of brevity, only heteroskedasticity corrected Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) results are presented here and outputs that are based on Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) are available in the appendix B. Further, results are shown for each of the 
90 
Table 2.1 
Constant Coefficient Specification: GLS Results 
Variable Statutory Tax Rate Effective Marginal Effective Average 
Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Constant 19.814b 16.817b 16.944b
(8.125) (7.462) (7.206) 
Host Tax -l.165b 0.531 -1.308
c 
(0.529) (0.856) (0.694) 
Home Tax 0.202 0.267 0.075 
(0.254) (0.166) (0.218) 
ULC -7.9578 -7.6298 -7.4648
(1.704) (l.559) (1.563) 
RGDP -0.435 -0.4708 -0.4498
(0.171) (0.170) (0.168) 
BITR 0.2568 0.2438 0.2598 
(0.049) (0.039) (0.048) 
TPLUS 3.4638 4.1468 3.4988 
(0.613) (0.493) (0.615) 
INT 0.024 -0.210 0.057 
(0.253) (0.255) (0.247) 
EXR 0.027 -0.015 0.023 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Adjusted R2 0.931 0.941 0.938 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c, indicate significance at the 
1 %, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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three types of tax rates: statutory tax rate, effective marginal tax rate, and the effective 
average tax rate. We should expect to see a negative coefficient for the host country tax 
rate and a positive coefficient for the home country corporate tax rate. Table B 2.1 of the 
appendix suggests that tax both types of tax coefficients are generally insignificant. Not 
only are tax rate and some of non-tax coefficients insignificant but also they are 
inconsistent with the theory. 
Compared to the OLS results (see appendix B), GLS method appears to remove 
most of these problems in the OLS results. After heteroskedasticity is corrected, we are 
able to obtain consistent tax rate coefficients. Overall, results seems much better than 
those obtained from OLS method. However, we still have inconsistent outcomes for some 
non-tax variables such as relative GDP and exchange rate. We assume no cross sectional 
or time specific effects in this model. These are highly restricted assumptions that could 
distort the true picture of the relationship between variables. 
In order to check whether constant coefficient method is misspecified, an analysis 
of covariance test is used. It compares error sums of squares of the constant coefficient 
model with other models. We expect error sums of squares to be higher for the constant 
coefficient model because it assumes a common intercept for all the countries. We test 
the null hypothesis that intercept restrictions are correct. Our results reject the null 
indicating that constant coefficient specification is invalid. 
We conclude that a specification that allows for heterogeneity across cross section 
terms would improve the results. Following this guidance, we estimate a fixed effects 
model. This model also can be estimated using either the OLS or GLS method. Leaving 
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OLS results for the appendix, we describe the fixed effects GLS model in this section 
because it provides results that are more consistent with the theory. 
As indicate in the Table 2.2, fixed effects reduces much of the impact of host 
country tax rate changes. For example, the host country effective average tax elasticity 
falls from-1.308 to -0.912, when fixed effects are allowed to enter the model. This is 
also true for the statutory tax rate elasticity, even though the reduction is much smaller. 
Results again confirm that foreign investors are responsive to the U.S. corporate income 
tax rate. The coefficient of the statutory tax rate is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. A one percent increase in the statutory top corporate tax rate reduces 
FDI inflows by 1.1 percent. The coefficient on the average effective tax rate has the 
expected negative sign, but not statistically significant. 
As we hypothesized, the home country corporate tax rate seems a significant 
determinant of FDI inflows to the United States. Coefficients of both effective marginal 
tax rate and effective average tax rate are positive and statistically significant. As far as 
statutory tax rate is concerned, it displays the expected positive sign, but statistically 
insignificant. Hence, results in general, indicates that whenever home country increases 
its corporate tax rate, investors experience a reduction in their existing after tax rate of 
return and start dislocating mobile capital from their own country and possibly invest in 
the United States in the from of FDI. On average, a 10 percent increase in the home 
country effective marginal corporate tax rate would reduce FDI inflows of the United 
States by approximately 6 percent. Results also reveal that the response for the home 
country tax rate is smaller in magnitude than for the host country tax rate. To illustrate, 
average significant tax rate elasticity is -1.1 for the host country tax rate, while it is only 
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Table 2.2 
Fixed Effects Specification: GLS Results 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective Average 
Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Host Tax -1. lOO
b 
0.724 -0.912
(0.485) (0.570) (0.638) 
Home Tax 0.069 0.6268 0.512
c 
(0.293) (0.102) (0.289) 
ULC -6.1178 -7.0708 -5.8628
(1.206) (1.263) (l.197) 
RGDP 5.9478 7.0358 4.891
8 
(l.575) (1.220) (1.485) 
BITR 1,313b 1.3118 1.3718 
(0.509) (0.425) (0.510) I 
TPLUS 1.631 2.570
c 1.662 
(l.524) (1.328) (1.504) 
INT -0.07l -0.281 -0.051
(0.190) (0.187) (0.191) 
EXR -0.432b -0.9008 -0.401b 
(0.217) (0.192) (0.201) 
Adjusted R2 0.958 0.971 0.957 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1 %, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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0.55 for the home country tax rate. This study supports earlier finding that coefficient of 
effective marginal tax rate is generally higher than statutory tax rate based on studies 
(Mooij and Ederveen 2001). In this study, home country marginal tax elasticity is 
approximately 10 times larger than that of statutory tax elasticity. 
Relative GDP also appears to be one of the most important determinants of FDI. 
This again proves the generally accepted market size hypothesis regarding the 
detenninants of FDI. Ample empirical evidence exists suggesting that market size is a 
positive and significant determinant of FDI (Lee and Mansfield, 1996). Our result is also 
consistent with time series evidence that is presented in the first essay. Market size is not 
only highly significant but also quite large in magnitude. To illustrate, one- percent 
increase in relative GDP would increase FDI inflows by approximately 5.5 percents. 
Existing empirical evidence generally suggests that trade between host and home 
countries tend to be positively associated with the amount of FDI inflows implying that 
they are compliments rather than substitutes (Billington, 1999). Results of this essay 
strongly support this view. Bilateral trade variable can also be considered as an openness 
indicator. Our results imply that openness leads to more FDI flows. It is interesting to 
note that the trade variable is significant on all three tax rates and is similar in magnitude 
in every cases. Specifically, this study shows that, on average, 10-percent increase in 
bilateral trade would increase FDI inflows by 13 percent. 
Results reveal that investors are concerned about the infrastructure in the host 
country. We find that infrastructure is positively related to FDI inflows. This relationship 
is significant only on effective marginal tax rate. As far as magnitude is concerned, 
infrastructure is not as strong as other macro variables such as market size and trade. All 
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the countries in this sample have the reputation of having a good infrastructure. 
Therefore, it is understandable why they do not consider infrastructure as a critical factor 
when invest in the United States. 
Turning to other non-tax variables, exchange rate exerts a statistically significant 
negative effect on the amount of FDI inflows. It means that cheap dollar is an attractive 
factor for the foreign investors. Statistically significant relationship holds on all three 
types of tax rates. As shown in Table 2.2, our study produces an inelastic coefficient for 
the exchange rate regardless of the type of tax rate in the model. Study suggests that 
interest rate is not a significant determinant of FDI inflows of the United States. 
This study also estimates a random effects model and results are presented in the 
appendix. Results of the.random effects model are not substantially different from the 
fixed effects specification except some minor changes in non-tax coefficients. One such 
difference is that exchange rate becomes insignificant though it keeps the expected sign. 
As pointed out before, the random effects model requires that the number of cross 
sections be higher than the number of parameters to be estimated. In order to estimate the 
model, we omit interest rate variable because it is not statistically significant in the fixed 
effects model and its t-value is right around zero. It is interesting to note that coefficients 
of both tax and non-tax variables remain almost unchanged in magnitude and 
significance. It strongly implies that our results do not suffer from endogeneity bias. 
Since this panel covers a large majority of U.S. FDI inflows, the fixed effects model is 
more appropriate than a random effects model (Hsiao, 2003). 
A Hausman (1978) specification test is used to formally test whether fixed effects 
and random effects models produce significantly different results. We are unable to reject 
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the null hypothesis of fixed effects model and random effects model estimators do not 
differ considerably. Under this situation, it is safe to use fixed effects model because if 
the individual error component and explanatory variables are correlated, then random 
effects estimators are biased, whereas fixed effects estimators are unbiased (Gujarati, 
2003). 
This essay has raised two questions. The first question was whether host country 
and home country taxes matter for foreign investment decisions. Our results suggest that 
FDI inflows are negatively correlated with host country tax rate and positively correlated 
with home country tax rates. We observe that tax coefficients change slightly with 
different tax rates as well as different model specifications. For instance, fixed effects 
model produces a positive coefficient on effective marginal tax rate. Although the 
coefficient is insignificant, the positive relationship is still counterintuitive. Several 
previous studies have encountered a similar problem and they attribute this finding to tax 
policies in the capital exporting countries. 
As previously stated, a change in the corporate income tax rate could generate 
varying impacts on foreign investments depending on whether investors are from a tax 
credit or tax exemption country. Since capital exporting countries differ in their treatment 
of foreign source income, investors from those countries may also differ in their response 
to the U.S. corporate tax rate changes. In the next section we incorporate this important 
issue into the analysis. 
In order to analyze this question, we split the sample into tax credit and tax 
exemption groups. Then we estimate each pool using constant coefficient and fixed 
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effects models. It is not possible to estimate the random effects model because it requires 
the number of cross section units to be higher than the number of coefficients to be 
estimated. Unlike in the previous section, we do not focus on generalized least squares 
results. Since we split the sample into two relatively homogeneous groups, this procedure 
should alleviate any heteroskedasticity problem that might otherwise appear in the whole 
sample. Given that there is no serious heteroskedasticity problem, the OLS is the best 
estimator and not the GLS. Our preliminary estimation shows that GLS results are 
inconsistent and produce weaker results compared to those of OLS. 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 display OLS results of fixed effects model for the tax 
credit panel and tax exemption pool, respectively. Table 2.3 provides some support for 
our previous hypothesis that tax credit countries are less responsive to the U.S. corporate 
tax rate changes. None of the host country tax coefficients are statistically significant for 
the tax credit panel implying that foreign investors are more concerned about the home 
country taxes than about the U.S. corporate tax rate. lbis is understandable because 
investors can deduct corporate taxes they paid in the host country when calculate home 
country corporate tax liability. 
Unlike on credit group, statutory tax rate exerts a significantly negative effect on 
investors from tax exemption countries. As Table 2.4 illustrates, if the U.S. statutory 
corporate income tax rate decreases by 1 percent, then FDI inflows from tax exemption 
countries would go up by 1.9 percent. Investors from exemption countries have no 
corporate tax obligations in their home country. Therefore, it should not be surprising to 
find that they are very sensitive to the host country tax rate. Host country tax coefficients 
are not only significant, but also are larger in magnitude than those for the tax credit 
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Table 2.3 
Fixed Effects Specification OLS Results: Credit Countries 
Variable Statutory Tax Rate Effective Marginal Effective Average 
Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Host Tax -0.867 0.320 -1.512
(l.005) (l.178) (l.379)
Home Tax -0.516 0.9318 -0.783
(0.653) (0.261) (0.882) 
ULC -8.9148 -10.2698 -9.4718
(2.955) (2.857) (3.089) 
RGDP 0.240 3.903 1.251 I 
(3.882) (3.597) (4.029) 
BITR 1.846b 2.2458 1.790b
(0.722) (0.694) (0.738) 
TPLUS -1.366 -0.144 -0.419
(L973) (l.886) (2.090) 
INT 0.471 0.400 0.505 
(0.401) (0.450) (0.410) 
EXR -0.175 -0.254 0.013 
(0.449) (0.447) (0.510) 
Adjusted R2 0.662 0.662 0.625 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1 %, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table 2.4 
Fixed Effects Specification OLS Results: Exemption Countries 
Variable Statutory Tax Rate Effective Marginal Effective Average 
Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Host Tax -l.911c 1.599 -1.816
(0.966) (l.265) (1.157)
Home Tax 0.513 0.402 0.582
(0.712) (0.326) 0.623)
ULC -6.9508 -8.2988 -6.7878
(2.384) (2.323) (2.049)
RGDP 7.542b 7.7958 7.141
8 
(3.063) (2.231) (2.654) 
BITR 0.417 0.548 0.492 
(0.392) (0.367) (0.398) 
TPLUS 5.3068 5.6188 5.2268 
(1.229) (1.303) (1.240) 
INT -0.209 -0.567 -0.194
(0.297) (0.372) (0.294)
EXR -0.440 -1.0288 -0.564
(0.384) (0.356) (0.350)
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.559 0.561
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1 %, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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group. To illustrate, statutory corporate tax rate elasticity is a little more than twice the 
size for the exemption group than the one for the credit group. 
Finally, we discuss whether home country taxes could affect differently on tax 
credit countries and exemption countries. As previously stated, we expect a negative 
response from credit countries and no response from exemption countries. Table 2.4 
shows that none of the tax coefficient is statistically significant suggesting that exemption 
countries in fact are not sensitive to their home country tax rate changes. Since they have 
no tax obligations in home country, there should be no reason to be concerned about 
home country tax policy changes. 
Results for the tax credit countries are rather ambiguous. We hypothesized a 
significantly negative coefficient on home country tax rate for the credit panel. Although 
effective marginal tax rate elasticity is statistically significant at the 1- percent level, 
positive sign contradicts theoretical intuition. On the other hand, statutory tax rate and 
effective average tax rate has the expected negative sign, but both of them are statistically 
insignificant. There are several reasons that might have accounted for this ambiguity. 
One reason is that a tax credit system contains a lot of complications compared to 
an exemption system For instance, some countries such as the U.S. and Japan allow 
deferring any home country tax liability until they are repatriated in the form of 
dividends. The possibility of indefinite deferring can tum a credit country to an 
exemption country. 
Another complication arises if a home country reduces its corporate income tax 
rate such that the tax position of its investors changes from excess tax credit to deficit 
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credit situation. To illustrate, the U.K. has reduced its top corporate tax rates several 
times transforming practically it into an exemption country rather than a credit country. 
By 2000, the top corporate income tax rate in the United Kingdom had dropped to 30 
percent. Although the U.K. still remains as a credit country, its residents who invest in 
the U.S. currently have no home country tax obligations. The reason is that they are now 
in deficit credit situation since current US tax rate is higher than the home country tax 
rate. 
There is one more factor that could determine this relationship. As extensively 
detailed in the first essay, total FDI can be separated into reinvested funds and transfer 
funds. As far as reinvested funds are concerned, home country tax rates are not an 
immediate concern. Trai:isfer funds, on the other hand, should be more responsive to 
home country taxes. What we have is the combine effect. Since we are using aggregate 
data, it is not possible to separate out the two effects. 
Conclusions 
In this essay we use a panel of nine capital-exporting countries to investigate the 
impacts of corporate income taxes on foreign direct investment in the United States. In 
contrast to previous studies, host country and home country tax rates are explicitly 
accounted for. Various measures of corporate tax rates are used and different methods of 
pool estimations are estimated. Empirical results presented in this paper lead to the 
following conclusions. 
First, the U.S. corporate income tax rate exerts a significantly negative impact on 
inbound FDI of the United States. This finding is generally consistent with different pool 
specifications as well as different tax rates used in the model. However, results are more 
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robust for statutory tax rates than for effective rates. Investors probably know about host 
country statutory tax rates better than effective rates, so this finding is not surprising. A 
heteroskedasticity corrected fixed effects model finds an approximately unitary elasticity 
for the statutory tax rate, which suggests that a one percent increase in the U.S. corporate 
income tax rate would decrease FDI inflows by one percent. ·conversely, the home 
country tax rate shares a positive association with FDI inflows. The coefficient for the 
home country tax rate is inelastic for every tax rate specification, which implies that the 
U.S. should not expect considerable amount ofFDI inflows in an event of a tax increase 
in a capital exporting country. 
Second, host country tax rate elasticities for exemption countries are 
systematically different from those of credit countries. This finding suggests that 
investors from exemption countries are more responsive to taxes than are those from 
credit countries. Compared to whole panel, the host country tax elasticity is larger in 
absolute value for exemption countries than for credit countries. However, the two 
groups are not systematically different in their response to changes in home country tax 
rates. For example, we hypothesized a zero or very small response from tax exemption 
countries and a stronger negative response from credit countries. Though results for 
exemption countries are in line with our expectation, inconsistency is highly visible for 
the case of tax credit countries. Complexities in the credit system such as tax deferral and 
excess foreign tax credit may have caused this anomaly. 
Third, even though this study strongly suggests that the corporate tax rate is an 
important determinant of FDI in the United States, we should not underestimate the role 
of other non-tax detenninants. We find that non-tax determinants such as market size, 
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labor costs, bilateral trade and exchange rate consistently exert statistically significant 
impact on FDI inflows of the United States. Therefore, this study emphasizes the 
importance of a combination of fiscal and macro economic policy to stimulate FD I 
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Table A 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
FDI (Millions of$) 9826.33 13137.87 
Host Average Tax 34.26 3.23 
Home Average Tax 37.48 8.25 
Host Marginal Tax 23.05 1.05 
Home Marginal Tax 27.30 8.65 
Host Statutory Tax 41.57 5.06 
Home Statutory Tax 44.20 9.06 
Relative GDP (in 1996 $) 7.81 7.83 
Unit Labor Costs 95.06 3.82 
Telephone Linell 000 559.57 67.70 
Prime Interest Rate 9.16 1.98 
Bilateral Trade (Mil. of $) 59285.64 72573.74 
Exchange Rate 17.48 49.67 
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Appendix B 
Table B 2.1 
Constant Coefficient Specification: OLS Results 







































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1 %, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table B 2.2 
Fixed Effects Specification: OLS Results 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective Average 
Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Host Tax -l.696b 1.049 -l.887b
(0.691) (0.909) (0.893) 
Home Tax -0.017 0.6308 -0.548
(0.391) (0.181) (0.396) 
ULC -8.4448 -9.2148 -8.026
8
(l.726) (1.852) (1.698) 
RGDP 4.776b 4.973b 4.105
c 
(2.319) (1.995) (2.187) 
BITR 0.714c 0.863b 0.754
c 




1 8 3.3668 
(1.213) (1.299) (1.215) 
INT 0.015 -0.195 0.084 
(0.249) (0.294) (0.249) 
EXR -0.232 -0.635b -0.224
(0.310) (0.279) (0.290) 
Adjusted R2 0.593 0.605 0.594 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table B 2.3 
Random Effects Specification: GLS Results 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective 
Rate Tax Rate Average Tax 
Rate 
Constant 21.083 b 20.598 b 18.682 C 
(10.337) (9.371) ·(10.200)
Host Tax -1.423 C 0.687 -1.585 C 
(0.741) (1.020) (0.950) 
Horne Tax 0.169 0.485 0.576 
(0.462) (0.854) (0.468) 
ULC -9.239 8 -8.576 8 -8.996 8
(l.764) (l.625) (1.718) 
RGDP 1.980 0.747 1.837 8
(1.516) (1.222) (1.505) 
BITR 0.610 b 0.642 8 0.642 8 -.' 
(0.266) (0.235) (0.265) 
TPLUS 3.134 8 3.263 8 3.316 8
(0.930) (0.839) (0.948) 
INT * * * 
* * * 
EXR -0.050 -0.106 -0.088
(0.201) (0.165) (0.201) 
Adjusted R2 0.605 0.596 0.607 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 
1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
Interest Rate is dropped from random effects model because it is required that 
the number of cross sections are higher than the number of parameters in the 
equation. 
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Table B 2.4 
Constant Coefficient Specification OLS Results: Credit Countries 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective Average 
Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Constant 51.285 8 62.3248 54.8828 
(14.082) (15.152) (15.335) 
Host Tax 0.434 C -0.758 0.460 
(1.035) (l.512) (1.592) 
Home Tax -l.396 b 0.556c -0.719
(0.582) (0.313) (0.687) 
ULC -10.406 8 -13.4948 -10.775 8
(3.041) (3.380) (3.321)
RGDP -3.128b -3.5108 -3.546b
(1.548) (1.232) (l.629) 
BlTR 1.734 8 2.1188 1.8988 
(0.315) (0.258) (0.369) 
TPLUS -1.763 -1.809 -2.159
(1.295) (1.471) (1.396) 
INT 0.517 0.702 0.517 
(0.428) (0.492) (0.430) 
EXR -0.4368 -0.683 -0.5158
(0.134) (0.107) (0.163) 
Adjusted R2 0.603 0.600 0.585 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 
1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table B 2.5 
Constant Coefficient Specification GLS Results: Credit Countries I 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective 
Rate Tax Rate Average Tax 
Rate 
Constant 40.522a 50.499a 42.731a
(11.271) (13.022) (11.710) 
Host Tax 0.200 -0.286 0.056 
(0.889) (1.206) (l.241) 
Home Tax -1.352b 0.382 -0.829
(0.512) (0.235) (0.540) 
ULC -6.574a -9.506a -6.721b
(2.414) (2.920) (2,619) 
RGDP -2.907c -3.191 b -3.141 b
(1.481) (1.211) (1.479) 
BITR 1.766a 2.122a 1.874a ,,l 
(0.226) (0.216) (0.259) 
TPLUS -2.992a -2.888a -3.390a
(0.783) (1.051) (0.893) 
INT 0.644c 0.897b 0.746b
(0.364) (0.388) (0.353) 
EXR -0.436a -0.648a -0.485a
(0.099) (0.094) (0.115) 
Adjusted R2 0.947 0.947 0.952 
I 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 
1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table B 2.6 
Fixed Effects Specification GLS Results: Credit Countries 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective Average 
Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Host Tax -1.032 0.383 -1.619
(0.809) (0.818) (1.050) 
Home Tax -0.655 0.601a 0.319 
(0.548) (0.189) 0.640) 
ULC -5.076b -6.149b -5.289b
(2.327) (2.505) (2.493) 
RGDP 0.788 3.754 1.866 
(3.972) (2.836) (4.175) 
BITR 2.058a 1.833a 2.011a 
(0.539) (0.482) (0.558) 
TPLUS -3.133a 0.470 -2.397c
(1.169) (1.150) (1.249) 
INT 0.643b 0.459 0.749b
(0.319) (0.297) (0.312) 
EXR -0.019 -0.477 -0.192
(0.326) (0.293) (0.378) 
Adjusted R2 0.961 0.963 0.962 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 
1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table B 2.7 
Fixed Effects Specification GLS Results: Exemption Countries 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective 
Rate Tax Rate Average Tax 
Rate 
Host Tax -0.826 1.004 -0.391
(0.624) (0.771) (0.782) 
Home Tax 0.904
c 0.363c 0.886b










(2.223) (1.539) (1.888) 
BITR 1.038c 1.119b 1.121 
b
(0.551) (0.515) (0.556) 
TPLUS 3.584b 3.689b 3.600
b
(1.741) (1.729) (1.737) 
INT -0.258 -0.585b -0.341
(0.227) (0.239) (0.223) 
EXR -0.399 -1.0018 -0.613b
(0.275) (0.245) (0.243) 
Adjusted R2 0.965 0.968 0.965 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 
1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table B 2.8 
Constant Coefficient Specification OLS Results: Exem otion Countries 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective Average 
Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Constant 31.342 a 35.926 a 29.541 a
(9.930) (12.166) (9.142) 
Host Tax -0.720 1.152 -0.581
(0.813) (1.393) (0.995) 
Home Tax 0.188 0.217 0.188 
(0.301) (0.218) (0.280) 
ULC -ll.583 a -12.307 a -11.316 a
(2.034) (2.276) (1.913)
RGDP -0.190 -0.124 -0.174
(0.397) (0.404) (0.399) 
I 
BITR 0.133 b 0.149
a 0.139 b 
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 





(0.708) (0.657) (0.735) 
INT -0.385 -0.589 -0.382
(0.365) (0.431) (0.366) 
EXR -0.683 -0.813 -0.729
(0.519) (0.470) (0.503) 
Adjusted R2 0.488 0.492 0.486 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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Table B 2.9 
Constant Coefficient Specification GLS Results: Exemption Countries 
Variable Statutory Tax Effective Marginal Effective 
Rate Tax Rate Average Tax 
Rate 
Constant 16.853 a 25.526 a 18.535 b
(6.023) (7.592) (5.628) 
Host Tax -0.082 b 0.119 0.193 
(0.513) (0.976) (0.643) 
Home Tax 0.460b 0.198 0.370c
(0.255) (0.156) (0.221) 
ULC -8.998 a -10.660 a -9.384 a




(0.292) (0.302) (0.285) 
BITR 0.161 a 0.165 a 0.167 a
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) ··' 
TPLUS 5.195 a 5.072 a 5.255 a
(0.516) (0.506) (0.530) 
INT -0.466b -0.590b 0.518 
(0.257) (0.255) (0.254) 
EXR -0.611 -0.801 b -0.703
(0.384) (0.335) (0.352) 
Adjusted R2 0.960 0.955 0.958 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 
1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs. 
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